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I. DISENFRANCHISEMENT AS REMEDY, VOTE-COUNTING AS HARM
If anyone needed proof that constitutional law is a form of polit-
ics rather than a scientific discipline, the Supreme Court's 5-4 deci-
* Professor, American University, Washington College of Law.
WHAT'S WRONG WITH BUSH V. GORE
sion in Bush v. Gore1 should have settled the matter. The majority's
tendentious and fallacious decision was profoundly unconvincing to
anyone but those theologically certain that George W. Bush had to
win the election and that any alternative development would reflect
fraud. From this perspective, it made sense for the Supreme Court to
do everything in its power to freeze the election results and prevent
any further vote-counting.2 From any other perspective, the Court's
actions looked like a naked power grab.
We can mobilize fairly devastating precedent and logical analysis
to show why the decision was wrong. But what does it mean to show
that a Supreme Court decision was "wrong"? It is not like showing
that a scientific theory or mathematical calculation is wrong. Rather,
it is like showing a political position or moral choice to be wrong. It is
not wrong in the sense that it misdescribes a natural phenomenon or
violates a formal rule of logic. It is wrong in the sense that it cannot
accord with our sense of justice. But this just forces us to define who
"we" are, and American society is divided among different tendencies
and currents of political, philosophical, and moral thought, belief,
and feeling. Everyone understands that conservatives will rally to the
defense of the majority decision in Bush v. Gore, while liberals will op-
pose it.
Yet, if philosophical disagreement is to be expected with respect
to the interpretation of large and abstract constitutional concepts like
due process or equal protection, we have also depended on a greater
sense of agreement with respect to the structural provisions of the
Constitution by which we govern ourselves. If we cannot agree to the
basic rules of the game, then we are in trouble. This Article argues
that the Supreme Court's majority was free to discard basic demo-
cratic principles in Bush v. Gore because of the lack of a textually
rooted right to vote and because of the undemocratic character of the
electoral college. I argue here for the people to undertake the task of
constitutional politics in order to amend the Constitution to establish
the citizen's right to vote and direct popular election of the President.
A. A Political Question Raised By a Candidate Without Standing
In Bush v. Gore, five Justices nullified the Florida Supreme Court's
order of a statewide manual recount of thousands of "undervote" bal-
l. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) [hereinafter Bush I1].
2. Id. at 110-11 (per curiam).
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lots in the closely contested 2000 presidential election.' These were
mostly punch-card ballots that for various reasons-including
mechanical error and lack of manual strength in the voter-failed to
register a presidential choice in the mechanical vote-tabulation pro-
cess.4 The Florida Supreme Court had acted under state law to order
a statewide recount by hand of all such "pregnant," "dimpled," or
"swinging chad" ballots. 5 This statewide order answered Republican
complaints that it would be unfair-even if perfectly lawful in the
state-to manually recount only in a few counties where Vice Presi-
dent Gore had asked for it.6 But the Supreme Court majority deter-
mined that the Florida Supreme Court's command to the state's
election officials and judges to follow the state statutory standard of
discerning "the will of the voter" in counting ballots was insufficiently
precise.7 The conservative majority worried that "standards for ac-
cepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from county
to county but indeed within a single county from one recount team to
another."8 Thus, it found that the Florida Supreme Court's order vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause.9
The proper remedy for this equal protection violation, according
to the majority, would have been for the Florida Supreme Court to
engage in the "substantial additional work" of specifying the sub-stan-
dards governing different kinds of ballots."0 The problem, according
to the majority, and the reason why it had to blow the whistle on the
vote-counting, was that the Florida Supreme Court said that the legis-
lature intended the state's electors to be chosen by December 12, and
3. Id. at 111 (per curiam). The Justices supporting the per curiam opinion included
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Ken-
nedy (hereinafter the Bush 5).
4. See id. at 105 (noting that the ballots "either through error or deliberate omission,
have not been perforated with sufficient provision for a machine to count them").
5. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1261-62 (Ha. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000). The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case for "the circuit court
to immediately tabulate by hand the approximate 9000 Miami-Date Ballots, which the
counting machine registered as non-votes" and authorized the circuit court to order a
manual recount in all Florida counties that had not conducted a recount of the un-
dervotes. Id. at 1262.
6. See id. at 1252 (rejecting Governor Bush's contention that "even if a count of the
undervotes in Miami-Dade were appropriate, [the Florida election code] requires a count
of all votes in Miami-Dade County and the entire state as opposed to a selected number of
votes challenged").
7. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 109-10 (per curiam).
8. Id. at 106.
9. Id. at 103.
10. Id. at 110.
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[t] hat date is upon us, and there is no recount procedure in
place under the State Supreme Court's order that comports
with minimal constitutional standards. Because it is evident
that any recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will
be unconstitutional for the reasons we have discussed, we re-
verse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida order-
ing a recount to proceed. 1
On this reasoning, the Supreme Count terminated all further vote-
counting and became the first Court in our history to determine the
outcome of a presidential election. 12
The majority decision was utterly tendentious. It makes sense
only as a kind of judicial 100-yard dash. Five sprinting Justices raced
past every familiar principle of constitutional law to reach a political
finish line. Out of the gate, the majority disregarded several of its
most cherished tenets.
At the beginning, the majority never paused to consider whether
the whole case was a nonjusticiable "political question" constitution-
ally assigned to Congress. This is a serious problem because the initial
justification for judicial intervention was that the Florida Supreme
Court, in interpreting state law, was somehow disrespecting the state
legislature's primary control over the electoral process under Article
11.13 But if this was the case, there is a powerful argument that the
Court should have stayed out and allowed Congress to resolve the is-
sue.14 After all, Article II and the Twelfth Amendment give Congress
the central structural role in the counting and consideration of electo-
ral college votes. The Twelfth Amendment tells us that the presiden-
tial electors
shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President,
and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the
number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and cer-
tify, and transmit sealed to the seat of government of the
11. Id.
12. But see id. at 156 (Breyer, J., dissenting). After the 1876 presidential election, Flor-
ida, South Carolina, and Louisiana each sent two separate slates of electors to Washington.
Congress appointed an electoral commission to choose between the two sets of slates. That
commission was composed of Senators, Representatives, and Supreme Court Justices. In
1877, Justice Joseph P. Bradley cast the deciding vote on that commission, which resulted
in the pro-Hayes slates being appointed, and Hayes winning the Presidency. Id. However,
in Bush II, the Supreme Court, acting as ajudicial body, essentially decided the presidential
election for the first time in our history. See id. at 110-11 (per curiam).
13. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 73 (2000) (per curiam)
[hereinafter Bush 1].
14. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE,
AND THE SUPREME COURT 38 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).
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United States, directed to the President of the Senate;-The
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate
and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and
the votes shall then be counted ....
If no candidate collects a majority in the electoral college, the Presi-
dent is elected by the House of Representatives. 6 Nowhere is the Su-
preme Court given any formal role at all in choosing the President or
resolving competing interpretations of the electoral college
provisions.
The textual absence from the electoral college provisions of any
mention of the Supreme Court makes the Court's failure even to con-
sider the "political question" doctrine profoundly troubling. In Nixon
v. United States,17 the Court unanimously dismissed, on political ques-
tion grounds, a complaint by an impeached and convicted federal
judge who claimed that he was not properly tried by the Senate, as
called for by Article I, Section 3, because the full Senate delegated the
preliminary evidence-gathering function to a Senate committee
before receiving a report and hearing final arguments in the case.'"
Chief Justice Rehnquist found for the Court that the impeachment
process is exclusively for the Senate to work out because there is a
"textually demonstrable commitment of the issue"19 to the upper
chamber. 0 Significantly, the Chief Justice noted that the Court had
not been offered "evidence of a single word in the history of the Con-
stitutional Convention or in contemporary commentary that even al-
ludes to the possibility of judicial review in the context of
impeachment powers."'" This is true also of judicial review over the
electoral college. Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted the crucial
checks and balances concerns present where the judiciary was invited
to overturn the impeachment and conviction of one of its own
judges.22 The same kind of structural conflict of interest concern
looms where the Court helps put into office a President who will have
the power to appoint new Justices.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
16. Id.
17. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
18. Id. at 238.
19. Id. at 228 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
20. Id. at 238.
21. Id. at 233.
22. Id. at 234-35.
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The "political question" character of the electoral college issue is
reinforced by the "prudential" political question considerations. 23 For
nothing could be more perilous to the Court's legitimacy than to de-
cide a razor-close presidential election on novel and controversial
grounds.
Even if we help ourselves over the political questions hurdle, the
majority never even bothered to ask whether Governor Bush had con-
stitutional standing to raise his ultimately triumphant equal protection
claim against Florida on behalf of certain unidentified Florida vot-
ers.24 In equal protection cases involving racial minorities, the Court
has been adamant that plaintiffs seeking a hearing may assert neither
the rights of others nor abstract principles of fairness, but rather must
establish their own standing to bring a claim by showing that they
have suffered a concrete personal injury that is traceable to the gov-
ernment and redressable by the courts.25 Thus, in Allen v. Wright, the
Court denied standing to African-American parents who wanted to
compel the Internal Revenue Service to deny tax exemptions to pri-
vate schools that discriminate on the basis of race.26 Justice O'Connor
stated that citizens have no general right to make the government
comply with the law and found that the African-American plaintiffs
were not personally injured by the "abstract stigmatic injury" associ-
ated with white flight allegedly facilitated by the IRS policy.27
But in Bush v. Gore, the majority did not question whether (much
less explain how) Governor Bush was personally injured by the order
of a manual recount. Assuming that there was a threatened injury to a
certain subclass of pregnant chad voters, it would have been an injury
visited on them, not on Governor Bush, Vice President Gore, or any-
one else with standing to raise their claims for them. 28 If Bush's claim
was that he would have been personally injured as a candidate if all
23. Use of the political question doctrine "is prudential if it reflects the Court's con-
cerns about preserving judicial credibility and limiting the role of an unelected judiciary in
a democratic society." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
133 (2d ed. 2002).
24. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (discussing the constitutional foun-
dations for, and importance of, the standing doctrine).
25. See id. at 751.
26. Id. at 739-40.
27. Id. at 754-56.
28. Making Governor Bush's assumed injury all the more absurd, we do not even know
who the handful of hypothetically injured voters actually voted for, and one must assume
that the potential difference in treatment of pregnant chad ballots would have affected
people of different presidential choices equally. In truth, of course, the "injured" voters
were far more likely to be minorities and therefore Gore supporters because the more
heavily minority counties had the worst punch-card machinery and the highest rates of
ballot spoilation.
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ballots were not in fact counted, this might have been a plausible, if
speculative, argument on the theory that the winning candidate acts
as a proxy for the right of the majority to govern. The problem is that
the relief Governor Bush was seeking, and the relief that was ordered,
was not the counting of all the pregnant and dimpled chad ballots but
the counting of none of them. 29 Thus, he would have had to allege a
hypothetical injury arising out of the counting of a class of ballots that
the Court ultimately determined should have been counted.3" And
even if we assume, bizarrely, that Governor Bush was going to be pro-
spectively injured by the hypothetical possibility that anonymous third
party citizens not in the case might have their pregnant chad ballots
counted differently in one part of Florida than in another, how could
stopping the vote-counting sufficiently redress these third party inju-
ries? If your vote is in danger of not being counted, how does it help
you for the Supreme Court to make sure that someone else's vote is
not counted along with it? But the Court slipped merrily over these
insoluble contradictions and instead just assumed Bush's standing.
The standing problem mirrors the outrageous character of the
Court's emergency stay of the manual recount on December 7,
2000.1 The dissenters, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
pointed out that the majority's extraordinary injunction against the
counting of legal votes trampled on principles of federalism, separa-
tion of powers, and judicial restraint. 2 The dissenters hit the nail on
the head when they wrote: "Counting every legally cast vote cannot
constitute irreparable harm.""3 Although we do not know precisely
what the majority had in mind at this point-other than freezing the
result-Justice Scalia offered his own spirited defense of the stay: "The
counting of votes that are of questionable legality does in my view
threaten irreparable harm to petitioner Bush, and to the country, by
casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his
election." 4
This is an amazing claim. First of all, Justice Scalia's suggestion
that the pregnant chad ballots were of "questionable legality" was the
opposite of how the Court ended up ruling.15 The ultimate decision
found not that the ballots were suspect, but that the people who cast
29. See Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam).
30. See id. at 104-05.
31. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
32. Id. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
35. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 103 (per curiam).
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them had an equal protection right to get them counted in a fair pro-
cess. 6 The majority thus temporarily halted vote-counting because the
ballots were of "questionable legality," as Justice Scalia put it, and then
permanently halted vote-counting because these same ballots deserved
a system of perfect standards, and it was too late to craft one because
of the prior temporary halt in vote-counting!
Leaving that deeply suspicious "heads we win, tails you lose" clev-
erness aside, can "casting a cloud" on an election by means of vote-
counting constitute "irreparable harm"?37 The Court has held that
purely reputational or stigmatic harms are not sufficient to give rise to
constitutional standing,3" and that public officials can bring defama-
tion actions only if defamatory lies about them are told with "actual
malice."39 Justice Scalia voted with the majority in Clinton v. Jones4 ° to
allow civil suits against the President to proceed while he is in office,4
which would seem to establish that incidentally "casting a cloud" on a
President is not an "irreparable harm," but, from a citizen's perspec-
tive, a constitutional right.42 Under our First Amendment, we can
rain criticism and calumny down on our Presidents at will. 3
Even if we agree to treat condensation gathering over the heads
of elected officials as actionable harm, can such a precious interest
actually outweigh the interest that Vice President Gore and the people
had in seeing all of the votes counted (in the event that the Florida
Supreme Court acted properly). Consider the equities. If the moving
party (Bush) was right but vote-counting proceeded, the worst that
could happen is that some people would say he was not really elected.
But this was something that was bound to-and did-happen anyway.
However, if the moving party was wrong, and the vote-counting was
wrongly terminated, the worst that could happen would be that the
winner of the presidential election would be denied his office! In
weighing the harms, the two sides of the scale are not even close. In
any event, the majority, if it had been serious about both the reputa-
tional harm and democracy interests, could have simply ordered that
36. Id.
37. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1047 (Scalia, J., concurring).
38. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984).
39. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
40. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
41. Id. at 705.
42. See id.
43. Cf Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (stating that "debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials").
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the vote-counting proceed in all counties and the results be embar-
goed until the Court could reach a decision.
The stay actually decided the case on the merits because it was
the Court's final judgment that there simply was not enough time to
proceed with constitutionally required manual recounts.44 But the
reason there was (allegedly) not enough time to count ballots that all
agreed should have been counted was that the Court had itself halted
the vote-counting without any remotely plausible justification.45
B. And If It Had Been Gore v. Bush?
Had the shoe been on the other foot and Vice President Gore
had sought the Court's intervention to overturn the Florida Supreme
Court's decision to order a statewide manual recount at the request of
Bush, the Bush 5 would have voted to decline jurisdiction on federal-
ism, political question, standing, and separation of powers grounds. If
somehow, miraculously, jurisdiction had been granted, they would
have scoffed at the substantive claim that there was some kind of antic-
ipatory equal protection violation afoot in Florida threatening the
rights of pregnant chads to be treated equally across county lines. If by
some fluke they found that equal protection was even implicated by
the manual recount order, they would not have dreamed of usurping
the Florida Supreme Court by deciding the state law question of
whether there was sufficient time and statutory authority to develop a
new sub-standard and complete the statewide recount.
Indeed, if Gore had made these almost unimaginably daring
claims, the majority would have fallen back on its ordinary lethargic
indifference to denial of the right to vote. There is no shortage of
illustrations. The conservative majority has steadfastly maintained
that, as a categorical matter, it will find no equal protection violations
against minorities in the arrangement of voting processes unless the
plaintiff can demonstrate a governmental purpose to discriminate. In
City of Mobile v. Bolden,46 for example, the Court rejected both Equal
Protection Clause and Fifteenth Amendment attacks on an at-large
system of municipal elections in a majority-white city that for decades
produced an all-white City Council.4 7 The Court emphasized that
such at-large elections only "violate the Fourteenth Amendment if
44. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam).
45. Id
46. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
47. Id at 65, 73-74.
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their purpose were invidiously to minimize or cancel out the voting po-
tential of racial or ethnic minorities. "48
Yet, in Bush, the purpose test vanished. The plaintiffs never ar-
gued-and the Court never found-that the Florida legislature's pur-
pose in not specifying a vote-counting sub-standard was to minimize
or cancel out anyone's vote. Indeed, the Court never found that mini-
mizing or canceling out votes was even the effect of the standard. The
Court simply discovered to its horror that there were actually different
legal substandards potentially being used for vote-counting in differ-
ent counties in Florida.49 Why this relatively trivial and banal run-of-
the-mill possibility suddenly troubled a Court that has no problem, for
example, with radically different rates in administration of the death
penalty for murderers of whites than murderers of minorities is puz-
zling.5° Moreover, the Court accepts radically different levels of
spending on public school students in rich and poor counties and
school districts. 1 In the Supreme Court, dimpled chads have more
rights now than dimpled children.
On the merits of the equal protection claim, there can be no
doubt that had Vice President Gore and Governor Bush been in each
other's places, the conservative Justices in the majority would never
have embraced the equal protection argument. Governor Bush's law-
yers presented an equal protection argument so pathetic in the terms
of traditional doctrinal understandings that the Court itself refused to
certify it for consideration when Governor Bush first raised it on No-
vember 22, 2000 in his first petition to the Court.5 2 Only later when
they realized this was the only available hook to hang their hat on did
three Justices in the majority find new life in this approach.53 What
was a throwaway argument became the foundation of the Court's
opinion.
If Gore had brought such a claim and we assume (suspending all
disbelief) that the Court had entertained it, the conservative Justices
would have responded in an icy way. They would have first observed
that strict scrutiny does not apply because there is no suspect class
48. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
49. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 106 (per curiam).
50. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298-99 (1987) (finding Georgia's death pen-
alty statute constitutional even though a statistical study indicated a disparity in the imposi-
tion of the death penalty based on the defendant's race).
51. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (finding a
Texas school-funding system constitutional even though its reliance on local property taxes
resulted in increased funding for more affluent districts).
52. See Bush I, 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (per curiam).
53. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 103 (per curiam).
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targeted for adverse treatment based on race or ethnicity.54 Florida's
system thus would have only had to pass the lowest level of rational
basis scrutiny.55 That would have been no problem because almost
every state in the union uses the identical "intent of the voter" stan-
dard for manual recounts. 5 6 No state had ever specified a more pre-
cise pregnant chad substandard. If Vice President Gore had been the
petitioner, the Court never would have dreamed of nationalizing vote-
count standards in this way. Even if there were some minor problem
foreseen in varying methods of vote-counting, the Court would have
seen it as perfectly rational to have election judges make a front-line
determination as to whether a ballot reflects an intention to cast a
vote and, if substantially different standards emerged requiring more
specific resolution, to have the high court of the state reconcile the
different standards and pass upon the handful of close calls.
The Court in a hypothetical Gore v. Bush case would have recog-
nized how silly the equal protection claim really was. The potential
variation in treatment of pregnant chad or hanging chad ballots
among or within counties is, if anything, a due process issue. As an
equal protection issue, it is almost laughable, certainly trivial com-
pared to the actual sweeping disparities that exist among and within
counties as to different voting machines and vote-counting proce-
dures.5 7 Indeed, in Florida itself, the number of discredited "un-
dercount" ballots varied widely depending on the state and quality of
the machinery being used in the county, a kind of variation that corre-
sponded closely to race and wealth.58 Justice Breyer remarked that
"the ballots of voters in counties that use punchcard systems are more
likely to be disqualified than those in counties using optical-scanning
systems," which translates into a situation in which voters already ar-
rive at the polls with an unequal chance that their votes will be
counted.59
Even if one imagines, in a reverse Gore v. Bush scenario, the Rehn-
quist Court finding an equal protection violation arising from the fail-
54. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978) ("Racial and
ethnic classifications ... are subject to stringent examination .... ).
55. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (describing the three levels of scrutiny
in cases involving equal protection challenges).
56. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 124 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing the fourteen states
that follow the "intent of the voter" standard and the twenty-two states that follow the
"impossible to determine the elector's choice" standard for ballot recounts).
57. See PHILIP GARNER & ENRICO SPOLAORE, WHY CHADS? DETERMINANTS OF VOTING
EQUIPMENT USE IN THE UNITED STATES 4-6 (Brown Univ. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper
No. 2001-26, 2001) (listing the various ways that Americans vote).
58. SeeJOHN NICHOLS, JEWS FOR BUCHANAN 48-49 (2001).
59. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 147 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ure of Florida to adopt a specific vote-count substandard, it is
impossible to see how the Court's remedy would have ever been the
disenfranchisement of voters by halting the recount. If voters are
threatened with constitutional injury by potentially not having their
votes counted in an election when similarly situated votes in other
counties are being counted, that injury becomes absolutely certain
when the Court's relief is to order that the votes not be counted. How
are the rights of pregnant chad voters vindicated by judicial relief
compelling their automatic exclusion from the election? This para-
dox reflects the fact that there were no actually injured plaintiffs as
parties in Bush v. Gore available to complain about the absurdity of
disenfranchisement as the remedy for voting rights violations. Rather,
the plaintiff was a candidate desperately looking for ways to prevent the
counting of votes.6"
The majority not only ordered disenfranchisement as the remedy
for possible disenfranchisement, but mobilized voting rights cases to
nullify the right to vote.61 Ironically, the Court called on Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections,6 2 which struck down the poll tax in state
elections in 1966 because the poll tax discriminated against the
poor.63 But in a state like Florida, where the poor have the worst vot-
ing machines and the highest rates of ballot spoiling,64 a statewide
manual recount would have given poor voters more equal treatment,
not less. If there was an equal protection violation in Bush v. Gore, it is
found not in anything Florida did, but in the bizarre "relief' that the
Court ordered.
The pretext for the decision to shut down the manual vote re-
count on December 12 was that there was no time left for the Florida
Supreme Court to articulate an acceptable and uniform vote-counting
substandard.65 But why not? The state electors were not meeting un-
til December 18, six days later.66 Surely the hand counts of several
thousand "undercount" ballots could be completed in that time. So
why not remand the case to the Florida Supreme Court with the in-
struction to get the job done? This was the position taken quite sensi-
bly by Justice Breyer, who wrote that "there is no justification for the
60. See id. at 100 (per curiam).
61. See id. at 104-11.
62. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
63. Id. at 670.
64. See NICHOLS, supra note 58, at 48-49.
65. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 110 (per curiam) (terminating the manual recount of ballots
because "it is evident that any recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will be
unconstitutional").
66. Id. at 146 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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majority's remedy .... -"67 The majority took the position that, under
the Electoral Count Act of 1887, 3 U.S.C. § 5, controversies over the
electors need to be resolved "six days before the time fixed for the
meeting of the electors"6" and-what do you know-that very day, De-
cember 12, "is upon us." 69 Indeed, with the decision being released
by the Court at 10:00 PM, this day, alas, would actually be over in two
hours. How melancholy!
In reality, as the majority clearly understood, 3 U.S.C. § 5 simply
extends a statutory "safe harbor" to states appointing their electoral
college votes.70 It imposes no absolute requirement or deadline, and
many states have appointed their electors long after this date without
any problem in getting Congress to accept them.7 ' Justice Stevens
pointed out in his dissent that, in the 1960 presidential election, Con-
gress accepted Hawaii's electoral votes appointed on January 4, 1961,
several weeks after the safe harbor period was over. 2
In any event, the question of when Florida had to complete the
counting of its ballots is a paradigmatic state law issue.73 Indeed, in a
federal law sense, as the majority itself observed, a state could constitu-
tionally decide not to appoint any electors at all.7 ' Thus, whether
Florida law actually converts the federal "safe harbor" timetable into
an absolute statutory requirement or whether it favors the "will of the
people" above this other value is a quintessential state law question
that only the Florida Supreme Court can answer by interpreting the
Florida state constitution and relevant statutes. Yet the Court's major-
ity, without analysis or explanation, not only raised but decided this
fundamental state law issue, calling off a state's counting of ballots in a
presidential election for the first time in the nation's history.7 5 And,
while it disregarded and disrespected almost everything else that the
Florida high court did, the Supreme Court magnified and distorted a
passing statement by the Florida Court about December 12 to deter-
mine the state's own law, the award of its presidential electors, and the
67. Id.
68. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
69. Bush I1, 531 U.S. at 110 (per curiam).
70. See 3 U.S.C. § 5.
71. See Low Moment for High Court, DAILY NEWS, Dec. 14, 2000, at 16 (stating that twenty-
one states "outside of Florida didn't meet the December 12 deadline for finalizing their
slates of presidential electors").
72. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 147-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that the fundamental principle
of federalism compels the Court to typically defer to state court decisions on questions of
state law).
74. See id. at 104 (per curiam).
75. Id. at 110.
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nation's political destiny.76 Yet, nowhere did Florida law mention De-
cember 12, much less as some kind of compulsory statutory deadline.
Of course, had the majority been serious about creating exact
equality and parity across America's different voting districts, it could
have caused something like a revolution in our decentralized system,
where thousands of jurisdictions use widely different kinds of ma-
chines, ballots, counting procedures, registration rules, redistricting
processes, and voting systems. The Court obviously saw the danger
and hurried to stuff the genie back in the bottle. "Our consideration
is limited to the present circumstances," the majority wrote without a
trace of shame, "for the problem of equal protection in election
processes generally presents many complexities." 7 The Court took a
case that was not ripe and gave us a decision that was a dead letter on
arrival.
The conservatives thus upended five foundational relationships
in our constitutional system: (1) They usurped the role of the Florida
Supreme Court in interpreting state law. (2) They nullified the puta-
tive role of the American people by halting the counting of ballots in a
presidential election and effectively choosing the President for them.
(3) They preempted Congress's powers under Article II to accept or
reject the states' electoral college votes.7 8 (4) They reversed the
proper distribution of powers in national government by having Su-
preme Court Justices appoint the President rather than the other way
around.7 9 (5) They exploded the central principle of the rule of law
by finding that the Court can declare its own constitutional decisions
to have no precedential effect.
Now, isn't the obverse also true, that the liberals who dissented in
Bush would have voted in favor of vacating the Florida Supreme Court
and preventing a recount if Gore had been the narrow victor? I do not
believe so. The majority decision in Bush was so brazen a departure
for the conservatives and so ferocious an assault on both conventional
conservative and liberal doctrinal understandings that the liberals-
who on this Court are far more timid and measured than the conserv-
atives-would not have dared to invent a new equal protection right
in those circumstances to favor a Democratic candidate. They would
have almost certainly never taken the case and, if they had, would al-
most certainly have left the case to the Florida Supreme Court to
resolve.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 109.
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, c. 3.
79. See id. § 2, c. 2.
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Liberals have an abstract commitment to principles of fairness
and freedom that makes them the best upholders of the rule of law in
times of crisis. In fact, this is historically the famous conservative com-
plaint about liberals: their minds are filled with hopelessly abstract
and universal principles that they would impose on social institutions
without proper deference to the time-honored habits and working
mechanisms of society and authority.8" Conservative theorist Jerry
Muller observes:
Whether termed "the abuse of reason" (by Burke), "rational-
ism in politics" (by Oakeshott), or "constructivism" (by
Hayek), the conservative accusation against liberal and radi-
cal thought is fundamentally the same: liberals and radicals
are said to depend upon a systematic, deductivist, universalis-
tic form of reasoning which fails to account for the complex-
ity and peculiarity of the actual institutions they seek to
transform.8
Conservatives are more politically astute-more alert to the con-
crete political effects of legal arguments and constitutional proposi-
tions. How will deployment of this or that principle affect the people
whom I care about most? Their heads are not in the clouds of high
principle. Edmund Burke stated this disposition succinctly, in what
could be the very motto of the conservative majority in Bush v. Gore:
The practical consequences of any political tenet go a great
way in deciding upon its value. Political problems do not
primarily concern truth or falsehood. They relate to good or
evil. What in the result is likely to produce evil, is politically
false: that which is productive of good, politically is true.82
Did the conservatives reason backward, consciously or subconsciously,
from the result they wanted to reach (the political good)? To answer
the question with a question, how else do conservatives reason?
There is, of course, no way to prove this to be the case-history
not being falsifiable-and the point is not a crucial one. I am not
invested in demonstrating the superior moral virtue of the more lib-
eral Justices. But it is certainly worth noting that, in the bewildering
maze of litigation that took place in the 2000 election, every judge
described in the press as conservative decided in favor of Bush while a
number of liberal Democratic appointees decided against the Gore
80. CONSERVATISM: AN ANTHOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM DAVID
HUME TO THE PRESENT 14-15 (Jerry Z. Muller ed., 1997).
81. Id. at 14.
82. EDMUND BURKE, An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, in FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 73, 163 (Daniel E. Ritchie ed., 1992).
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campaign. Perhaps the best example is Judge Nikki Clarke, who pre-
sided over the case of Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Board,83
which concerned the Republican voter registrar in Seminole County
inviting a Republican party official to work in her office to add missing
voter identification numbers to Republican voters' requests for absen-
tee ballots.8 4 Despite the fact that there was convincing proof that this
was unlawful and a lopsided partisan tampering with the electoral pro-
cess, Judge Clarke nonetheless found that disqualifying hundreds of
absentee ballots would not be a fair remedy for the statutory viola-
tion. 5 Amazingly, in an act of characteristic psychological projection,
the Republicans had sought to have Judge Clarke, a liberal Democrat,
removed from the case on grounds of partisan bias. 6 Yet the value
system thatJudge Clarke actually brought to the case was one of favor-
ing democracy and vindicating, come what may, the will of the people;
this outlook, born of the hard-won twentieth century struggle for the
right to vote in the Deep South, required not the invalidation of bal-
lots, whatever may have been the shenanigans of county and party offi-
cials, but the counting of all ballots. Too bad she wasn't the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
In Bush v. Gore, America received a sharp, unforgettable lesson
about constitutional law. However much we would like it to be the
case that the Supreme Court stands apart from the social contest over
political and moral values, it is inevitably, inescapably, and irretriev-
ably right there in the center of it. And the fact of the matter is that
the Supreme Court has almost always been a profoundly conservative
institution in American life, protecting the traditional privileges of
race, class, gender, and property.s7 It was during a brief period of
liberal judicial activism on behalf of civil rights and civil liberties dur-
83. 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000).
84. Id. at 521.
85. Id. at 523.
86. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: How THE COURT DECIDED THE 2000
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 109 (2001).
87. From the 1856 decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (up-
holding the rights of slaveholders and ruling that African-Americans could not be citizens
within the meaning of the Constitution), to Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1872) and Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (upholding the exclusion of
women from the bar and their disenfranchisement in elections), to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding official race segregation even after the Fourteenth Amend-
ment), Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the relocation and in-
ternment ofJapanese Americans), Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (denying district
courts the power to order inter-school district relief in school segregation cases), Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (finding "bizarrely drawn" majority African-American congres-
sional districts inherently suspect under equal protection), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (imposing strict scrutiny on affirmative action set-aside pro-
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ing the Warren Court era that the Court gained its reputation as a
champion of minorities. 8 But it has completed its return to the old
juridical baseline of adjudication in the interests of conservative white
majorities.
C. Bush v. Gore: Hypocrisy and Reaction; Moral Expressivism and
Legal Realism
Many critics of the Bush v. Gore decision have assailed the five
Justices in the majority for acting in bad faith-hypocritically, with the
knowledge that they were betraying their own principles for partisan
purposes. Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz took pains to describe
his argument in his book Supreme Injustice as "ad hominem": "I am accus-
ing them of partisan favoritism-bias-toward one litigant and against
another. I am also accusing them of dishonesty, of trying to hide their
bias behind plausible legal arguments that they never would have put
forward had the shoe been on the other foot."89 Former prosecutor
Vincent Bugliosi denounced the "brazen, shameless majority" for its
"fraudulent" jurisprudence and called the five Justices "criminals in
the very truest sense of the word."9 ° George Washington Law Profes-
sor Jeffrey Rosen tided his essay in The New Republic, "Disgrace: The
Supreme Court Commits Suicide,"91 and The New Republic referred to
the "Republican larcenists, in and out of robes, who arranged to sup-
press the truth about the vote in Florida and thereby to make off with
the election of 2000."92 New York University Law Professor Anthony
Amsterdam charged them with "sickening hypocrisy,"9" and Harvard
Professor Randall Kennedy said that they "acted in bad faith and with
partisan prejudice."94
grams), the Court has consistently endorsed conservative and authoritarian power arrange-
ments in society.
88. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of
Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARv. L. REv. 30, 63 (1993) ("The
singular achievement of the Warren Court is that it sought to reconcile the supposed con-
flict between majority rule and minority rights by assuming that a greater social inclusive-
ness and empowerment of minorities was an extension of democratic values.").
89. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELEC-
TION 2000, at 110 (2001).
90. Vincent Buglioso, None Dare Call It Treason, NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 11, 13.
91. Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace: The Supreme Court Commits Suicide, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25,
2000, at 18.
92. Unsafe Harbor, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000, at 9.
93. Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Law is Left Twisting Slowly in the Wind, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2000, at M5.
94. Randall Kennedy, Contempt of Court, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2001, at 15, 16.
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It is, no doubt, comforting to think that the Justices acted hypo-
critically. For if they knew that there was no valid basis for stopping
the vote-counting but chose to do it anyway, we would at least preserve
the consoling comfort that there is a natural and agreed-upon moral
order in the legal universe. But doesn't it seem more likely, after Le-
gal Realism and Critical Legal Studies, that there is no such order and
the five Justices actually believed, in their heart of hearts, that theirs
was the right decision? We resist this conclusion because we then face
the disturbing possibility that constitutional law is not ultimately an
empirical science but a kind of political rhetoric by other means. We
would have nothing solid to fall back upon other than our own values.
But this is indeed the human condition.
All of us are partisans. We may be partisans, dismally, to an ex-
isting political party or candidate. We may be partisans, more fruit-
fully, to certain values and principles. The call to "objectivity" is an
effort to pull us back from a particular set of partisan commitments to
a broader view of the situation. But hitting the Bush 5 over the head
with the bludgeon of "objectivity" only works if they secretly admit to
themselves or their loved ones that they were swayed by narrow parti-
san passions and would have decided the case differently had it been
brought by Vice President Gore instead of Governor Bush. But do the
conservative Justices actually acknowledge or embrace their personal
hypocrisy and the historic bad faith of their decision? Do they con-
sciouslyjustify to themselves the partisanship that seems so obvious to
others?
Here is where we learn something profound about the symbiotic
relationship among emotional desire, rational analysis, and moral
choice. The answer is, of course, no: the Bush 5 would never concede
that they would have decided the case differently had Gore been the
one appealing. Indeed, they insist on the contrary proposition. It was
only a matter of days before Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist were insisting that partisanship never enters into the Justices'
reasoning.95 They would never concede the radical novelty, illogic, or
bad faith of the decision.
The conviction by the BushJustices that they were right teaches us
a lot about the extraordinary and distinctively human powers of self-
delusion and self-rationalization. The belief by conservative Justices
(and their supporters) in the complete innocence of their decision is
held sincerely and passionately. And here is where I think American
95. Neil A. Lewis, The 43rd President: Justice Thomas Speaks Out on a Timely Topic, Several of
Them in Fact, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A23.
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jurisprudence, which has wavered between a naive belief that the law
is a neutral, deductive, and apolitical field of inquiry (classical legal-
ism) and a belief that law is sometimes inevitably political and partisan
in nature (legal realism), could benefit from a much richer integra-
tion of moral epistemology and cognitive psychology.
Judicial decision-making is a kind of human decision-making.
Judges and Justices are humans, part of the genus mammal; the Rehn-
quist bloc is part of the same species as the signers of the New York
Times ad.96 We all think and act as human beings. In human beings,
"emotion is integral to the processes of reasoning and decision mak-
ing, for worse and for better."97 Legal consciousness is just one form
of human consciousness, and, "in the end, consciousness begins as a
feeling . "..."98 The Bush 5 departed radically from almost every
known legal principle or convention, not out of conscious bad faith,
but out of the passionate conservative feelings they have about
America, the Constitution, and the kind of society to which they want
to belong.
1. Moral Realism and Moral Expressivism.-We can elaborate the
point through reference to moral philosophy. The central debate in
moral philosophy, as I see it, is between moral realists and moral expres-
sivists.99 Moral realists believe that ethical properties exist indepen-
dently and objectively in the world."' ° On this theory, the task of
ethics is to describe the moral properties of things, qualities, and
events.
The moral realists are opposed most significantly and persuasively
by the moral expressivists.'t ' Expressivists believe that moral statements
are not empirical observations about objective natural phenomena in
the world but the expression of the subjective judgments, beliefs, atti-
tudes, and values of the person making the statement.10 2 Thus, ethics
is not the scientific process of people discovering objective values that
exist in things, but rather the social process of people creating values,
the activity of people "valuing things."'03 Moreover, while the process
96. 554 Law Professors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001 (paid advertisement), at A7.
97. ANTONIO R. DAMAsiO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE
MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 41 (1999).
98. Id. at 312.
99. See generally SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASON-
ING (1998) (providing a lucid and authoritative treatment of the difference between moral
realism and expressivism).
100. See id. at 84-121.
101. See generally id.
102. Id. at 50.
103. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
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of moral analysis necessarily deploys reason to understand the facts of
a situation and make arguments about the likely effects of this or that
course of action, ultimately moral choices themselves are based on the
values, attitudes, and beliefs-the feelings-that motivate all human
decision and action.
10 4
Moral expressivism, closely following the work of David Hume,
opposes the claim pressed by moral realists that moral duty requires
the subordination of desire to reason. 10 5 More to the point, moral
expressivism denies that such a thing is possible. Indeed, Hume ar-
gued the very opposite of the Platonic position: "Reason is and ought
only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any
other office than to serve and obey them."106
Hume gave a dramatic example to make his case. There was
nothing unreasonable or irrational, he argued, about his "prefer[ring]
the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger."10 7
Nothing in logic or reason can explain why such a choice is wrong. It
is only subjectively formed feelings, beliefs, values, experiences, and
attitudes that can convince someone not to prefer the loss of the
world to the loss of his fingernail.'0 8 He argued, similarly, that it is
not "contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowedg'd lesser
good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former
than the latter."10 9
The great contemporary philosopher Simon Blackburn, a profes-
sor at Cambridge University, follows Hume and explains the general
point, telling us: "Reason can inform us of the facts of the case ...
[and] which actions are likely to cause which upshots. But beyond
that, it is silent."110 All human decisions are motivated finally by what
Blackburn calls our "concerns," which are supplied not by the calcula-
tions of objective reason and logic, but by our beliefs, passions, feel-
ings, and desires."'
At first blush, this is an arresting claim for those of us who want to
believe that law, like other cognitive disciplines, is and should be an
exercise of pure reason and logic. We want law to have, at its bottom,
foundations in pure reason and to think of ourselves as thinking ani-
104. Id. at 240.
105. Id. at 238-39.
106. Id. at 238 (quoting DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 415 (L.A. Shelby
Bigge ed., 1888)).
107. Id. at 239 (quoting HUME, supra note 106, at 418).
108. See id.
109. Id. (quoting HUME, supra note 106, at 418).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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mals. And that we are: thinking animals, to shift the emphasis. That
is, we are animal sentient beings motivated by particular passions,
desires, needs, concerns, priorities, values, and wants. We use our
minds to interpret, analyze, and advance these passions, desires, and
concerns. All of the world-everything that is the case, as Wittgen-
stein defined it-is frozen, impervious, and inscrutable to us without
the intervention of human perception and motivation. 1 2 We will
have little power to understand what actually takes place in constitu-
tional adjudication and analysis unless we grasp that beliefs, values,
and attitudes establish the lens through which legal meanings are un-
derstood, interpreted, refracted, debated, created, and determined.
There is no doubt that the expressivist position must travel uphill
against accumulated centuries of belief in the independent powers of
sovereign reason. Since the time of the ancient Greeks, philosophy
imagined a world in which rationality governed desire and appetite."'
In the Phaedrus, Plato championed the supremacy of the intellect and
likened reason to a chariot-driver who whipped the wild horses of
emotion and passion into line in order to move the chariot for-
ward.114 Many conservative scholars today believe that if reason is de-
throned and does not master and govern our passions and concerns
we will be drawn to immorality and darkness.' 15 Consider the closing
lines of Professor Stephen L. Carter's book, Integrity:
This approach provides the foundation of integrity as I have
discussed it in this book: we must make the effort to learn
what is right (rather than what we desire) and then to do it.
Aristotle placed the intellect above the appetites, Rousseau
placed reason above inclination, and the theologians placed
God's will above our own. What one sees in every case is the
refusal to accept as the measure of morality our choice to do
the things that most attract us. To make satisfaction of our
desires the only morality is to choose the path away from civil
society-away from civilization-and back to the state of na-
ture. Valuing the appetites above reason is the path, in fact,
toward evil. 1 6
112. LUDWIG WIrrGENSTEIN, NOTEBOOKS, 1914-1916, at 82e-84e (G.H. von Wright &
G.E.M. Anscombe eds., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969) ("What others in the world have
told me about the world is a very small and incidental part of my experience of the world.
I have to judge the world, to measure things.").
113. PLATO, PHAEDRUS 455-57 (Harold North Fowler trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1977).
114. Id. at 471-73.
115. STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY 241-42 (1996).
116. Id.
672 [VOL. 61:652
WHAT'S WRONG WITH BUSH V. GO.RE
This claim captures beautifully the central myth and conceit of
American jurisprudence. Professor Carter compresses into one para-
graph all of the classical dualisms of Western thought: "what is right"
versus "what we desire"; "the intellect" versus "the appetites"; "reason"
versus "inclination"; "God's will" versus "our own"; "civilization" versus
"nature." On the left side of each contrast lie the demands of the
rational mind, which are the "foundation of integrity"; on the right
side lie the heart and the sensual will, a wholly separate path, "the
path, in fact, toward evil." '11 7
Carter's argument about law places him squarely in the camp of
moral realism (not to be confused with "Legal Realism," which comes
very close to being its opposite)."' Moral realists believe that the ethi-
cal properties of goodness and badness, right and wrong, actually exist
as properties in the world.1 19 Thus, the moral claim that "the death
penalty is wrong (or right)" is an empirical statement that can be con-
firmed or refuted. The task of ethics is to observe and record those
objective moral properties inhering in different problems, choices,
and events and then to choose to do the right thing by bringing our
actions into accord with these objective requirements. 120
Legal thinkers who follow in this tradition of ethical realism,
whether they are conservatives like Professor Carter or liberals like
Professor Ronald Dworkin, correspondingly believe that there are de-
finitive and objective "right answers" in law. 1 2 1 If we can just keep our
unruly private passions and preferences in check, we will know which
answers are right and which ones wrong.1 2 2 If we "make the effort to
learn what is right (rather than what we desire)," as Professor Carter
urges, then it is only a matter of will to choose to do it.1 23 Similarly,
Professor Dworkin supposes that if we only had a perfectly omniscient
judge, whom he calls Hercules, we could arrive at all of the right an-
swers in legal jurisprudence, even in the hardest cases. 124
2. Moral Realism and Legal Realism at Odds.-Moral realism thus
provides the philosophical frame for natural law theory, the doctrine
117. Id.
118. For a detailed review of Legal Realism, see generally AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (Wil-
liam E. Fisher, III et al. eds., 1993).
119. See BLACKBURN, supra note 99, at 119-21.
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88
HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1975).
122. CARTER, supra note 115, at 242.
123. Id.
124. Dworkin, supra note 121, at 1083-87.
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that "there is a certain order in nature that provides norms for human
conduct."125 On this theory, as rendered by St. Thomas Aquinas, "nat-
ural law was humanity's 'participation' in the comprehensive eternal
law."126 In a system of constitutional law, natural law theory either
uses natural law concepts to supplement written constitutional provi-
sions, an idea suggested by Justice Samuel Chase in Calder v. Bull,127 or
reads open concepts like "due process" or "liberty" through the prism
of some understanding of natural law and natural justice. 121 Al-
though moral realism has a hold on the modern philosophical imagi-
nation, American constitutional law has long since abandoned natural
law theories, at least as a self-conscious justifying ideology for extra-
textual decision-making.' 29 OnlyJustice Clarence Thomas, in a hand-
ful of speeches and articles before joining the Court, has overtly
flirted with natural law theory.'3 0 But he has essentially disavowed it
since joining the Court and now considers himself a textualist and an
originalist.
If moral realism is the philosophical structure for natural law the-
ory, moral expressivism furnishes the best ethical metatheory for mak-
ing legal realism sensible, compelling and, I will argue, noncynical. As
a formal matter, legal interpretation takes place through the screen of
organizing principles, conventions, and rules. One might assume,
then, with Christopher Columbus Langdell, that law is a rational sys-
tem of knowledge in which all legal truths are deducible and discover-
able through reason.' 3 ' But Legal Realism proved at the beginning of
the twentieth century-and Critical Legal Studies showed again at its
125. Christopher Wolfe, Natural Law, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 581, 581 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
126. Id.
127. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
128. See Wolfe, supra note 125, at 581 (explaining natural law theory).
129. See Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797, 797-98 (1993)
(discussing an on-going reluctance to connect issues of constitutional interpretation with
natural law theory).
130. See, e.g., SUSAN Low BLOCK & THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, SUPREME COURT POLITICS
219-20 (1994) (quoting a speech of Justice Thomas in which he said that the "higher law
background of the American Constitution, whether explicitly appealed to or not, provides
the only firm basis for a just, wise, and constitutional decision").
131. See Robert W. Gordon, The Case For (And Against) Harvard, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1231,
1245 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MOD-
ERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994)) (stating that according to Lapiana, Langdell at-
tempted to create a "legal science" which would be autonomous from all other social
norms); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Century's
End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1999) ("The formalists clearly believed that the law was
comprised of principles-including definitions, concepts, and doctrines-broad in their
generality, few in their number, and clear enough to permit answers to the questions of law
to be more or less directly deduced.").
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close-that there are almost always available different and competing
sources of authority and rules of interpretation to allow courts to re-
solve the same case in different and opposite ways. 132
Thus, underlying value choices must guide large systems of doc-
trinal constitutional development in the law. In a democratic society
where everyone cares about rights and popular culture is transfixed by
law, these value choices are inescapably political choices as well be-
cause everyone cares about them. Does substantive due process forbid
interference with the right to contract? Does it forbid interference
with a woman's right to choose an abortion in consultation with her
physician? Whole bodies of case doctrine and legal principles are
built on these initial underlying value choices. Moreover, "indetermi-
nacy" presents itself again in the form of "gaps, conflicts, or ambigui-
ties" in the interstices of developing and even well-developed legal
doctrine.1 3 Here again, value choices surface-for example, does the
right to choose an abortion extend to minors in the face of a state
parental consent law? A doctrinal consensus around large principles
will crack open and revive interpretive controversy-with whatever le-
gal principles may be at hand-whenever later subsidiary conflicts re-
incarnate the original clash of values. Thus, at both macro- and
micro-junctures, underlying moral and political visions, or their hard-
ened doctrinal sediment, will motivate judges to choose particular
lines of development and results.
This is not to say that there will be no cases where it is perfectly
obvious that a particular rule or form of reasoning dictates a particu-
lar kind of answer. 3' Sometimes ideological and epistemological con-
sensus on the Court is sufficiently broad, clear, and definite that no
plausible alternative can present itself. 35 But whenever it deals with
an issue of profound moral and political controversy, as the Court did
in Bush v. Gore, distinct and polarizing legal norms will quickly emerge
to reproduce in legal form the underlying moral and political value
conflict. Law becomes politics by other means.
The theory of moral expressivism, like Legal Realism, explains
why we find so many 5-4 Supreme Court decisions, not just in Bush v.
132. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997); Felix Cohen, Tran-
scendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935).
133. Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theoy to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's
"Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 107 n.33 (2000).
134. Even Duncan Kennedy, the brilliant expositor of legal indeterminacy, accepts the
fact that existing rules will sometimes dictate an obviously and intuitively correct answer in
some cases. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
135. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Gore, but running throughout our constitutional jurisprudence and
dealing with weighty issues like abortion, the death penalty, civil
rights, and freedom of speech. The same pattern often obtains in less
dramatic statutory confrontations on the Court relating to the envi-
ronment, access to the courts, housing, and so on. It cannot be the
case that these sharp divisions appear on the Court because certain
Justices are smart enough to perceive ethical and constitutional facts
and others are too stupid or some are lazy and others are hard-work-
ing or that some have access to better information than others. What
determines the differences in outcomes is the filter of attitudes, val-
ues, and beliefs that the Justices bring to the task of analyzing the
relevant legal materials and the task of judging.
3. Hypocrites or Reactionaries?-If it is tempting for liberals to call
the conservative Justices hypocrites and judge their souls, we might
resist the temptation and focus instead on what they indisputably are:
reactionary judicial activists. Hypocrisy is a moral charge that indi-
rectly flatters our own integrity and objectivity. Reaction is a political
charge that forces us to think and act politically to change the balance
of power in favor of the values we champion.
Intriguingly, most of the Court's harshest critics never called for
the impeachment of the offending Justices for knowingly subverting
the Constitution. Why not? The Republicans brought impeachment
charges against President Clinton for acts far less damaging to Ameri-
can democracy and the rule of law. 36 Perhaps it is because they re-
gard Bush v. Gore as a freakish moral lapse rather than a logical entry
in an ongoing political project.
Progressives certainly can understand the appeal of a political
analysis that "put[s] hypocrisy first,"' 37 in the words of Judith N. Sh-
klar. But we have special reason to reject excessive reliance on that
approach to understanding law. As Thomas Paine wrote in his pref-
ace to Common Sense, "the Object for Attention" must be "the Doctrine
itself, not the Man."138 However, Paine also later remarked that
the political characters, political dependencies, and political
connections of men, being of a public nature, differ exceed-
ingly from the circumstances of private life; and are in many
136. See generally Symposium, Bidding Adieu to the Clinton Administration: Assessing the
Ramifications of the Clinton "Scandals" on the Office of the President and on Executive Branch
Investigations, 60 MD. L. REV. 1 (2001).
137. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 86 (1984).
138. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
PAINE, at 67, 68 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., 1967).
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instances so nearly related to the measures they propose,
that to prevent our being deceived by the last, we must be
acquainted with the first.
13 9
In this sense, it is fair for critics of Bush v. Gore, such as Professor
Dershowitz, to point out the dense network of political connections
and conflicts that entangled the Justices with the parties and lawyers
before the Court. The five Justices in the majority were appointed by
Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and the first Bush. Justice Scalia's son
worked for Gibson Dunn, one of the law firms representing Bush in
the case. Justice Thomas' wife was collecting resumes at the time to
staff the prospective Bush administration from her perch at the Heri-
tage Foundation. Chief Justice Rehnquist allegedly had a desire to
retire and a corresponding strong preference to be replaced by a Re-
publican appointee. Reportedly, he also had a personal history of
challenging African-American and Hispanic Democratic voters at Ari-
zona polling places in 1962.140 As the Republican nominee, Governor
George W. Bush hailed Justices Thomas and Scalia as his ideal jurists.
One could spend pages on these kinds of connections and overlaps."'
But these apparent conflicts of interest (confluence of interests is
actually more like it) only take us so far in our juridical analysis. In
reality, we all are compromised and defined by partisan beliefs and
values, not necessarily in the narrow sense of attachment to a political
party, we hope, but certainly in the larger sense of commitments to
ideas and values. The particular entanglements that catch public at-
tention-Justice Scalia's son, Justice Thomas' wife-reflect life cir-
cumstances and associations that simply open a little window into the
underlying structures of feeling and belief that motivate us. But does
anyone really think that the case would have come out any differently
had Justice Scalia's son not been working at Gibson Dunn or had Vir-
ginia Thomas not been preparing for the presidential transition at the
Heritage Foundation? Even without these charged personal associa-
139. THOMAS PAINE, THE FoRESTER's LETTERS (1776), reprinted in I THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS PAINE, supra note 138, at 127, 134.
140. Democracy Now: As Supreme Court Decides Presidency, ChiefJustice Rehnquist is Accused of
Past Harassment of Black Voters at the Polls (Pacific Radio radio broadcast Dec. 12, 2000),
available at http://www.webactive.com/pacifica/demnow/dn20001212.html (discussing
how, at his 1986 Senate confirmation hearings on his promotion to Chief Justice, numer-
ous witnesses testified that, in 1962, Rehnquist aggressively questioned minority voters on
their way to vote in Arizona about their suffrage qualifications).
141. For the various connections and conflicts between the Justices and the parties and
lawyers in the case, see generally Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartial-
ity and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REv. 606 (2002).
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tions, the conservatives on the Court would have been motivated suffi-
ciently to secure a halt in the vote-counting and Bush victory.
To shift the discussion from hypocrisy to reaction is not to reha-
bilitate the majority. On the contrary, I yield nothing to Dershowitz,
Kennedy, Bugliosi, Rosen, and Amsterdam (each of whom I admire)
in my contempt for that egregious decision. To charge bad faith, how-
ever, requires us to assume that the Justices in the majority knew that
what they were doing was wrong and acted in conscious disregard of
its unfairness. This is questionable psychological speculation that dis-
tracts us from the ideological and jurisprudential system that produced
and excused this outrageous assault on democracy.
In fact, although no doctrinal foundation existed for what the
conservative Justices did in Bush v. Gore, their unprincipled treatment
of the issues is perfectly congruent with their reactionary approach to
other key cases structuring the dynamics of political democracy. Bush
v. Gore was the natural successor to nakedly activist and political Court
decisions dismantling majority African-American and Hispanic legisla-
tive districts and replacing them with majority-white districts, 42 Court
decisions upholding discriminatory ballot access laws and establishing
the "two-party system,"' 43 and the Court's outrageous decision up-
holding the exclusion of third party candidates from government-
sponsored or corporate-sponsored candidate debates. 144 If we can
have a closed two-party system based on a white-majority norm, why
not just a one-majority-white-party system?
Judges should try to be fairminded. But, when push comes to
shove, there are no "neutral principles of constitutional law,"145 as
Herbert Wechsler famously promised. There are principles that ad-
vance particular norms and values in history, but there is nothing neu-
tral about their content.
In Bush v. Gore, five conservative Republican-appointed Justices
examined the same facts and the same body of law as four moderate-
to-liberal Justices-two Republican appointees and two Democratic
appointees-but came up with, for the most part, completely different
judgments about how to analyze, resolve and dispose of the case. This
142. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See
generally Jamin B. Raskin, The Supreme Court's Racial Double Standard in Redistricting: Unequal
Protection in Politics and the Scholarship That Defends It, 14 J.L. & POL. 591 (1998).
143. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997); Jenness v. Fort-
son, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
144. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). See generally
Jamin B. Raskin, The Debate Gerrymander, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1943 (1999).
145. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
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division reflected not the stupidity, venality, conscious hypocrisy, or
moral obtuseness of one group or the other, but the fact that adjudi-
cation requires, above all, interpretive judgment. Legal interpretation
occurs through the filter of political attitudes, beliefs, perceptions,
and values that inevitably shapes all human perception and judgment.
Judges and Justices are human beings, part of the genus mammal, and
in humans, "emotion is integral to the processes of reasoning and de-
cision making, for worse and for better."'46
The crucially important question for Americans is: why was the
constitutional language so pliable that the Bush majority could arrive
at such an astonishing resolution? Why is democracy so unsettled a
constitutional value? What characteristics of our constitutional struc-
ture permitted such an extraordinary turn of events to take place?
The answer lies in the curious absence of a constitutional right to vote
and the strange institution of the presidential electoral college.
II. THE PEOPLE'S MISSING RIGHT TO VOTE
"[T]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional right
to vote for electors for the President of the United
States ... 47
You have read this correctly: we, the people, have no constitu-
tional right to vote for President or for the electors who choose the
President. This declaration creates the karma-the logical sequence
of cause and effect- that leads to the Court's dazzling disenfranchise-
ment of thousands of people as a remedy for hypothetical due process
problems in the counting of a few ballots.
Now the Court's vision of there being no right to vote for Presi-
dent is not logically or historically compelled. True, the Constitution
nowhere explicitly states that all citizens have a right to vote. But
there is a powerful argument that the evolution of the "one person,
one vote" decisions in the 1960s established the states' duty to include
citizens in all elections. 148 Certainly the textual silence around the
right to vote in presidential elections should be no more controlling
than the textual silence around other rights or powers implied in the
Constitution, such as the right to choose an abortion,'49 the right to
146. DAMASIO, supra note 97, at 41.
147. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
148. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
149. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (concluding that the right to privacy
includes the right to choose to have an abortion).
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marry, 5 ' the power of states to criminalize sodomy,151 or the power of
government to disregard normal search warrant and probable cause
requirements in public schools152 or at the border. 151
More to the point, other parts of the Constitution heavily favor
voting, including amendments specifically protecting "the right of citi-
zens of the United States to vote" against discrimination on the basis
of race, 15 4 sex, 155 residency in the District of Columbia (in presiden-
tial elections), 56 failure to pay poll taxes,'5 7 or age once a citizen is
eighteen years old.151 If you combine this overwhelming constitu-
tional preference for suffrage with the Ninth Amendment, which
states that the "enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people,"' 1 51 it seems almost irresistible that the democratic right to
vote exists.
But the current Court reads the Constitution as establishing the
state legislatures' absolute power to choose presidential electors with-
out public participation if they so desire. Although the states pres-
ently hold popular elections to choose the electors, the Court was
clear that any legislature could decide to bypass the voters and ap-
point electors of its choosing: "the state legislature's power to select
the manner for appointing electors is plenary; it may, if it so chooses,
select the electors itself .. ."160 There is, therefore, no durable safety
for popular voting rights not anchored in the visible text of the
Constitution.
150. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1978) (categorizing the decision to
marry as among the personal decisions protected by the right to privacy); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's miscegenation statute and stating that
"[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").
151. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding a state statute against sodomy
constitutional because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
create a fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy, even in the
privacy of their own homes).
152. NewJersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 809 (1984) (holding that school searches need only
meet a reasonable suspicion standard and do not require warrants).
153. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (holding that border searches
require only reasonable suspicion).
154. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
155. Id. amend. XIX, § 1.
156. Id. amend. XXIII, § 1.
157. Id. amend. XXIV, § 1.
158. Id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
159. Id. amend. IX.
160. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
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The constitutional silence as to where the right to vote should be
explains an awful lot about the chaotic 2000 election. Because we
have not grounded voting in the constitutional architecture, it be-
comes a political plaything vulnerable to the ploys and whims of local
elites. The NAACP's hearings into what went wrong in Florida found
time-honored tricks: poll workers illegally insisting that African-Ameri-
cans produce two forms of identification, including one photo ID;
mysteriously changed polling places and painfully incompetent poll
attendants; 8000 Floridians being wrongly purged as ex-felons by a
state-hired private consultant who did not even give them notice;
punch card ballots being marred and thrown away; and misleading
ballot designs, such as the infamous "butterfly ballot," which pro-
duced the anomaly of Jewish Holocaust survivors voting en masse for
Patrick Buchanan.1
61
Without a national constitutional structure supporting the act of
voting, the bottom falls out easily on democratic participation. The
2000 election was ultimately decided not by the people, a majority of
whom clearly opposed the victor,16 2 but by a sequence of deliberate
and accidental disenfranchising events, last-minute absentee balloting
by overseas military personnel, a hellbent five-Justice bloc on the Su-
preme Court, and the state legislative-controlled and party-dominated
electoral college.
The strategic machinations and negligence of our election man-
agers are predictable where suffrage is not a bedrock constitutional
right enforceable in federal court, but instead a political right strug-
gling to stay afloat in the sea of contest. Local manipulators of public
consent (of whichever party) calculate that they will suffer little ad-
verse consequence for their gamesmanship if their favorites win.
There was nothing terribly special about Florida other than the sud-
den burst of sunshine on the process. Ajoint study by the California
Institute for Technology and Massachusetts Institute of Technology
determined that, out of 100 million votes cast in the 2000 presidential
contest, between four and six million were simply never counted.
1 63
This is the reserve army of the disenfranchised that reappears in every
election to help the official managers of our politics maintain local
161. NAACP Public Hearings on the Florida Vote (CSPAN television broadcast, Nov. 11,
2000).
162. Election 2000 National Results, available at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/
results/national.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2002).
163. CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, VOTING: WHAT Is, WHAT COULD BE
3 (2001).
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equilibrium. And so it goes where the "citizen has no federal constitu-
tional right to vote."
A. The Missing Right to Vote in House and Senate Elections:
Disenfranchisement in the District
The shaky foundations of political democracy are notjust a threat
to our participation in presidential elections. The "individual citizen"
of the United States also has no federal constitutional right to vote for
Senators and Representatives.164 Just a few months before Bush v.
Gore, a majority on the Supreme Court made this point by affirming a
2-1 decision by the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia that rejected a claim that American citizens have a right to
vote in congressional elections.' 65 Although not nearly as famous as
Bush v. Gore, this case even more directly presented the question of
whether American citizens have a democratic right to vote under the
Constitution. The answer is no.
The case, Adams v. Clinton, was brought by then-District of Colum-
bia Corporation Counsel, John Ferren, a former D.C. Court of Ap-
peals judge and a passionate advocate of the rights of
Washingtonians.' 66 Ferren sued the Secretary of Commerce on be-
half of 570,000 American citizens living in the District of Columbia
who are denied the right to vote for U.S. Senators and House Mem-
bers (and must rely solely on a single non-voting Delegate in the
House, a post occupied today by the extraordinarily able Eleanor
Holmes Norton) .167 The fifty-six named plaintiffs were a rainbow
spectrum of American life from all the District's vibrant eight wards,
including teachers, firefighters, doctors, veterans, professional ath-
letes, university presidents, writers, artists, and the lead plaintiff Clif-
ford Alexander, a former Secretary of the Army under President
Jimmy Carter who had run for mayor in 1976.161
Ferren asked the court to order the Secretary of Commerce to
include Washingtonians in the decennial reapportionment letter that
he would be sending to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
in 2000 to report where Americans live for the purposes of congres-
164. Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C.), affd, 531 U.S. 941 (2000).
165. Adams v. Clinton, 531 U.S. 941 (2000).
166. Id. at 37-38. I acted as co-counsel on the case, originally titled Alexander v. Daley,
along with Assistant D.C. Corporation Counsel Walter Smith, and Covington & Burling
attorneys Tom Williamson, Evan Schultz, and Charles Miller.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 35-37.
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sional redistricting. 6 ' The plaintiffs also sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief compelling Congress to provide for their
representation in both houses of Congress, either directly, by seating
the District's own representatives, or by some indirect mechanism,
such as participating in the election of members of Congress from
Maryland or another state.170
The plaintiffs maintained that their disenfranchisement from
congressional elections violates equal protection and the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship.17 1 Brick by brick, they rebuilt
a wall of equal protection precedent invalidating grandfather clauses,
exclusionary white primaries, state poll taxes, restrictions on voting by
soldiers away from home, unnecessarily long residency requirements,
disenfranchisement of citizens living on federal enclaves, prohibitively
high candidate filing fees, and malapportioned legislative districts.' 72
This line of authority, they argued, creates a constitutional imper-
ative of universal suffrage. Indeed, the malapportionment cases spe-
cifically established the foundational "one person, one vote" principle.
The plaintiffs cited Justice Black's powerful statement in Wesberry v.
Sanders, a decision that struck down congressional districts with widely
disparate populations:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of hav-
ing a voice in the election of those who make the laws under
which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the
most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.
Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people
in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right.1 73
In the same year, in Reynolds v. Sims, Chief Justice Warren wrote:
[T]he weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend
on where he lives.... This is the clear and strong command
of our Constitution's Equal Protection Clause .... This is at
the heart of Lincoln's vision of "government of the people,
by the people, [and] for the people." The Equal Protection
Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legisla-
tive representation for all citizens, of all places as well as all
races. 1
74
169. Id. at 38.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 100-07 (Oberdorfer,J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (articu-
lating plaintiffs' arguments).
173. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
174. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567-68 (1964).
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The D.C. plaintiffs argued that equal protection must extend uni-
versal suffrage to people living in the federal city, who share all the
essential characteristics of citizens of the states: they pay federal taxes,
indeed more per capita than any state but Connecticut; fight and die
in foreign wars and are conscripted into the military whenever there is
a draft; vote for President and Vice President under the Twenty-Third
Amendment; are governed by federal laws and enjoy all other consti-
tutional rights, such as the freedoms of speech, press and assembly. 175
They showed that the selective denial of federal representation to the
citizens of Washington is doubly unjust. Not only is Congress their
national legislature but their local legislative sovereign as well. It has
power to make laws for the District and veto those passed locally by
the Council of the District of Columbia.
In Alexander v. Mineta, the plaintiffs pointed out that the Supreme
Court determined in 1970 that Maryland could not disenfranchise cit-
izens living at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) federal campus
in Rockville.176 In Evans v. Cornman, the Court rejected Maryland's
argument that these people were the direct subjects of Congress
under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, and therefore had no right to
vote in Maryland's federal and state elections. 177 By the same token,
the plaintiffs argued, Congress, which exercises the same "exclusive
Legislation" 178 over District residents as it did over the residents of the
NIH campus, could not disregard its obligation to give District citizens
the right to vote and be represented in Congress.
The often-heard claim that the District is "too federal" for its citi-
zens to vote in congressional elections was proven illogical. Neither
federal employees nor their family members or neighbors are disen-
franchised anywhere else in the country, and the vast majority federal
employees live outside Washington, D.C. 179 So it is hard to see the
compelling reason for disenfranchising Washingtonians, only a small
percentage of whom work for the federal government. Just as Con-
gress could not segregate public schools in the District of Columbia
(any more than states could segregate their own), S0 just as Congress
could not shut down the Washington Post or establish a church (any
more than a state could violate the First Amendment),"' so Congress
175. SeeJamin B. Raskin, Is This America? The District of Columbia and the Right to Vote, 34
HiARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 39, 55-56 (1999).
176. See Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
177. Id. at 426.
178. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
179. Raskin, supra note 175, at 72.
180. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
181. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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cannot deny the basic political rights of voting and representation.
That was the plaintiffs' argument.
But all of the Warren Court's old-fashioned rhetoric about the
fundamental importance of voting went for naught. The District
Court found there were no basic political rights that applied to all of
us. The majority stated: "The Equal Protection Clause does not pro-
tect the right of all citizens to vote, but rather the fight 'of all qualified
citizens to vote.' "182 To be qualified, you must belong to a "state"
within the meaning of Article 1183 and the Seventeenth Amend-
ment184 and must be granted the right to vote by the state." 5 The
court was not moved by the fact that the District of Columbia is
treated like a state for more than 500 statutory purposes, from high-
way and education funds to Selective Service and Internal Revenue
provisions, as well as for every other major constitutional purpose, in-
cluding the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Diversity Jurisdiction
Clause. Thus, two judges in Alexander v. Mineta overruled the senior
judge on the panel, Louis Oberdorfer, to find that, however "undemo-
cratic" the condition of residents of the nation's capital may be, simply
being United States citizens subject to federal taxation and military
conscription does not confer on Washingtonians a right to vote or to
be represented in the Senate and House. 8 6
We could hardly have it clearer: there is no affirmative universal
constitutional right to vote. This is no longer an eccentric conservative
gloss on the document. It is black-letter law based on a haunting tex-
tual silence: if you go searching for an explicit popular right to vote in
the Constitution, you come up empty-handed. The hard-won lan-
guage in the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments
forbidding discrimination in voting establishes no mandatory univer-
sal right to vote. Those amendments were ad hoc efforts to prevent
discrimination against specific populations. They worked pretty well.
Thus, the Florida legislature cannot selectively disenfranchise African-
Americans in its selection of presidential electors today (well, theoreti-
cally at least), but it can disenfranchise everyone, as the Rehnquist
Court kindly reminded us."8 7 Similarly, while the Nineteenth Amend-
ment means Congress cannot selectively disenfranchise women in the
182. Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 66 (D.D.C. 2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964)) (emphasis added).
183. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 633, 665 (1966).
184. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 50.
185. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 39 (1892).
186. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
187. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
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District of Columbia, it can disenfranchise all women and men living
in Washington by denying them a place in Congress. Anti-discrimina-
tion amendments simply do not help when government may legiti-
mately disenfranchise everyone in a textually unprotected class.
B. Territorial Subjects: The People of Puerto Rico, American Samoa,
Virgin Islands, Guam
The good people of Washington, D.C. who face taxation without
voting representation in Congress have at least been able to partici-
pate in presidential elections since 1964 because of the enactment of
the Twenty-Third Amendment three years prior.'88 But there are mil-
lions of American citizens living in the American territories "8 -Pu-
erto Rico, American Samoa, Virgin Islands and Guam-who cannot
even vote for the President who is their national leader and com-
mander-in-chief in times of war.190 The American flag waves, but
there is no voting for President on Election Day.
To be sure, the residents of the territories are exempt from fed-
eral individual income taxes, 9 ' but otherwise possess all of the rights
and responsibilities of American citizenship, including military con-
scription and service, 1 9 2 the duty to obey federal laws and policies,'
9 3
local legislative and budgetary autonomy,'94 and so on. The lack of
188. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1. The Amendment states:
The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall ap-
point in such manner as the Congress may direct:
A number of Electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole
number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would
be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous state;
they shall be in addition to those appointed by the states, but they shall be consid-
ered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be elec-
tors appointed by a state; and they shall meet in the District and perform such
duties as provided by the twelfth article of the amendment.
189. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 810 tbl.1327 (1998).
190. Iguarta de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 1994).
191. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; David M. Helfeld, The Constitutional and Legal Feasi-
bility of the Presidential Vote for Puerto Rico, in Six SPECIAL STUDIES REQUESTED FOR THE AD Hoc
ADVISORY GROUP ON THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR PUERTO RICO 87, 102-04 (1971).
192. See United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 979 (D.P.R. 1968) (holding that
the Selective Service Act, which makes every male citizen of the United States liable for
service in the armed forces, applies to territory residents who are United States citizens).
193. See Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899) ("In the territories of the United
States, Congress has the entire dominion and sovereignty. . . and has full legislative power
over all subjects upon which the legislature of a State might legislate within that
state . ").
194. See Amber L. Cottle, Comment, Silent Citizens: United States Territorial Residents and
the Right to Vote in Presidential Elections, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 315-17.
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federal personal income taxation may roughly excuse the need for
territorial voting representation in the Congress that raises and
spends tax dollars, but disenfranchisement in presidential elections is
a purely gratuitous insult that makes the relationship between the
United States and the people of these territories a gratingly neo-colo-
nial and obsolescent one. The people of the territories overwhelm-
ingly desire the right to vote for their President. By what logic do we
deny it to them?
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the "exclusion of U.S. citizens residing in the territories from
participating in the vote for the President of the United States is the
cause of immense resentment in those territories-resentment that
has been especially vocal in Puerto Rico."' 95 There are 3.8 million
residents of Puerto Rico and another 2.7 million Puerto Ricans living
on the mainland.196 According to judge Leval, the political exclusion
of Puerto Ricans "fuels annual attacks on the United States in hear-
ings in the United Nations, at which the United States is described as
hypocritically preaching democracy to the world while practicing
nineteenth-century colonialism at home."'' 9 7
"These problems of fairness, resentment, and impaired reputa-
tion are serious ones,'"'judge Leval wrote in the second of two cases
that recently reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit in New York essentially challenging the disenfranchise-
ment of citizens living in Puerto Rico. In a world where one person-
one vote is the gold standard for democratic society, the current re-
gime is untenable. Each of the territories has a unique history inter-
acting with the United States where the dynamics of colonialism,
exploitation, dependence, and interdependence have all played a
part. But, in the new century, wherever U.S. citizens live under the
U.S. flag, everyone should minimally have the right to vote for Presi-
dent. If the territories leave the American Union, their residents will
no longer be U.S. citizens, but as long as they are with us, and we have
every reason to believe this will be forever, they should have a right to
cast a vote in national elections for President.
195. Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2001).
196. Rafael E. Declet, Jr., The Mandate Under International Law for a Self-Executing Plebiscite
on Puerto Rico's Political Status, and the Right of U.S.-Resident Puerto Ricans to Participate, 28
SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 19, 41 (2001).
197. Romeu, 265 F.3d at 127-28.
198. Id. at 128.
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C. Former Felons
Consider another important example of a suffrage-vulnerable
population. Today, eight states permanently disenfranchise all per-
sons who have committed felonies even after they have finished their
criminal sentences, and another four states disenfranchise some such
ex-offenders based on offense.' 9 9 A handful of ex-felons in these
states win their suffrage back through gubernatorial pardons or legis-
lative action, but this is extremely rare.20 0
Although most states restore voting rights to people who have
done good time, the disenfranchised ex-felon population in the
others is substantial. All told, more than 1.4 million Americans who
did good time and repaid their debt to society are disenfranchised
today and most of them will remain voteless for life.20
Disenfranchised ex-offender communities are disproportionately
made up of racial minorities. This pattern follows from well-docu-
mented racial dynamics in the ceaseless and hopeless War on Drugs.
The American inmate population is approximately seventy percent Af-
rican-American and Latino today. In 1999 "close to 800,000 black
men were in custody in federal penitentiaries, state prisons, and
county jails.... 20 According to the Sentencing Project, in two of the
states that deny the vote to ex-offenders, "one in three black men is
disenfranchised" and in eight others, "one in four black men is disen-
franchised. If current trends in criminal arrests, prosecution, and
conviction continue, the rate of disenfranchisement for black men
could reach 40 percent in the states that disenfranchise ex-
offenders. 20 3
The practice of stripping people of the franchise for life based on
felony convictions has dramatic political consequences. In Florida's
2000 election, where George W. Bush captured the state's 25 electoral
199. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT
OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, at pt. I (1998), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote [hereinafter FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT].
200. Id. In Maryland and Virginia, for example, ex-felons must convince the Governor
through the Parole Board to remove their political disabilities, although as of this writing a
bill is making its way through the Maryland legislature to enfranchise ex-felons. According
to the Sentencing Project and Human Rights Watch, which issued an excellent report on
the subject, while there are more than 200,000 ex-convicts in Virginia, only 404-far less
than 1%-won their right to vote back in 1996 and 1997. Id at pt. II. In Mississippi, an ex-
con needs a gubernatorial executive order or a bill passed by two-thirds of members in
each house and a gubernatorial signature. See id. Good luck.
201. Id. at pt. I.
202. Loic Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis, BOSTON REV., Apr./May 2002, available at http://
bostonreview.mit.edu/BR27.2/wacquant.html.
203. FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, supra note 199, at pt. I.
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college votes on the basis of fewer than 500 individual votes cast, there
were more than 200,000 ex-felons disenfranchised." 4 Thus, for every
single voter in George Bush's margin of victory, there were 400 Ameri-
can citizens in Florida disenfranchised in the election and for life
based on a policy the vast majority of states have rejected.
The 1.4 million voteless ex-offenders nationwide are part of a
population of 3.9 million Americans who have lost their voting rights
because of a felony conviction.2 °5 Of this number, 2.5 million are still
in prison, on probation, or on parole. 20 6 Although incarcerated
felons can vote in many countries, they are denied the right to vote in
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia and retain the right to
vote only in Maine and Vermont.20
7
The broader policy of felon disenfranchisement has remarkable
effects of its own. Today's prisoners are usually shipped from heavily
minority and pro-Democratic urban areas to overwhelmingly white
and conservative rural areas where prison construction has increas-
ingly taken place. The prisoners count for census and reapportion-
ment purposes in these rural areas because it is where they live, but
they cannot vote there. They thus swell the power of conservative
white politicians committed generally to punitive justice policies.
Jonathan Tilove writes that the inmates at the famous Attica prison in
western New York state "are represented in Albany by state Sen. Dale
Volker, a conservative Republican who says it's a good thing his cap-
tive constituents can't vote, because if they could, 'They would never
vote for me."' 2 8 Tilove notes that this phenomenon "raises funda-
mental questions of fairness: Is it right that America's prison popula-
tion, now mostly black and brown, should be counted in a manner
that augments the power of communities with which they have no real
connection or common interests?
20 9
Of course, most Americans see the logic of disenfranchising peo-
ple actually serving time for felonies. Losing the right to vote is part
of a general loss of civil liberty arising out of conviction for a serious
criminal offense. It might make more sense to have such a depriva-
204. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States 1,
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/brief/pub1046.pdf (last visited June 17,
2002).
205. FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, supra note 199, at pt. I.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Jonathan Tilove, Minority Prison Inmates Skew Local Populations as States Redistrict,
NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 12, 2002, available at http://www.newhousenews.com/
archive/storyla031202.html.
209. Id.
2002] 689
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tion of liberty determined at sentencing by a judge who weighs the
nature and gravity of the offense. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable
enough that people denied the rights of free movement, intimate as-
sociation, and free speech should also suffer loss of voting rights dur-
ing the course of their punishment.
The question is whether the loss of voting rights during the course
of a criminal sentence should become a permanent mark and brand
of second-class citizenship after the sentence is served. The Supreme
Court has found that felon disenfranchisement laws do not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because Section 2
of that Amendment authorizes states to strip citizens of their voting
rights "for participation in rebellion, or other crime"210 without fear
of losing population basis for representation in the House of Repre-
sentatives. 211 In its 1974 decision in Richardson v. Ramirez, Justice
Rehnquist found for the Court that "the exclusion of felons from the
vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment .... 212 Ironically, this provision, which was designed to em-
power states to disenfranchise ex-Confederate rebels,215 has come to
further erode and undermine the political power of African-Ameri-
cans. The right to vote is not only an emblem of social standing, as
Judith Shklar argued, but also quite clearly a unit of instrumental col-
lective power.2 14 When large portions of communities are peeled
away from the electorate, the groups to which they belong lose politi-
cal clout. Prisoners are at the bottom of society and have almost no
way to express their needs.
Disenfranchising people who have already served all their time,
including probation and parole, serves no criminal justice purpose. It
has no deterrent value. It punishes only in the most gratuitous and
silently sadistic way. It does not rehabilitate. On the contrary, it be-
comes a statement of permanent political estrangement and civic in-
corrigibility. The criminal sentence becomes a scarlet letter tattoo,
the kind of indelible "Corruption of Blood" that is condemned in Arti-
cle III, Section 3 of the Constitution relating to treason.215
This lifetime branding cuts against everything we believe in about
citizens having the power to overcome the errors of the past. To the
210. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 2.
211. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
212. Id.
213. See id. at 43-52; see also William E. Nelson, Fourteenth Amendment, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 757, 758 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
214. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, REDEEMING AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 186 (Stanley Hoffman
& Dennis F. Thomson eds., 1998).
215. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
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extent that slaves were denied the right to vote (among even more
basic liberties), and to the extent that prisoners today have fallen to a
level just a cut or two above that of slaves, the official lifetime denial of
voting rights to former felons acts as a kind of "badge and incident" of
slavery.2 1 6 It is time to get rid of this humiliation and restore a sense
of belonging and membership to our fellow citizens returning from
prison.
D. From Visionary to Laggard: America's Missing Right to Vote in
International Context
The worldwide movement toward democracy owes more to the
United States than to any other nation. In the eighteenth century, the
American Declaration of Independence and our Bill of Rights (along
with the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen)
spread revolutionary democratic notions of popular consent and
equality around the globe.217
In the last century, democratic nations embraced the concept of
"one person-one vote" that was worked out in the struggle of the mod-
ern American civil rights movement. As Bob Moses and Charles Cobb
tell us in their important book, Radical Equations, the organizing slo-
gan of "one person-one vote" was born in the Deep South in the early
1960s. It gave "Mississippi sharecroppers and their allies" in the Civil
Rights Movement a principle of "common conceptual cohesion."218
The moral and mathematical clarity of the concept created solidarities
of belief and understanding among disenfranchised tenant farmers,
northern college students, civil rights organizers, and other oppo-
nents nationwide of political tyranny and terror. The doctrine of "one
person, one vote" was soon picked up by the Justice Department and
then articulated by the Warren Court in the redistricting cases. 219
In Gray v. Sanders, which struck down a Georgia election system,
Justice Douglas wrote:
The concept of "we the people" under the Constitution visu-
alizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those
who meet the basic qualifications .... The conception of
political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to
216. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
217. See generally Richard A. Easterlin, The Globalization of Human Development, ANNALS
AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci., July 2000, at 32, 33.
218. ROBERT P. MOSES & CHARLES E. COBB,JR., RADICAL EQUATIONS: MATH LITERACY AND
CrVIL RIGHTS 91 (2001).
219. See generally Robert McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH.
L. REv. 223 (1968).
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Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth
and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-
one person, one vote.
2 20
The one person-one vote concept, which has since traveled the world
from Poland to South Africa to Chile, could have led our Supreme
Court to spell out a robust doctrine of universal suffrage under equal
protection.
But it was not to be. When the Court took a hard right turn in
the 1990s, voting and political participation were treated, once again,
a lot more like state-issued privileges than fundamental rights.221 In
the 1990s, the Rehnquist Court repeatedly dismantled majority Afri-
can-American and Hispanic congressional districts brought into being
under the Voting Rights Act, inscribing into law a presumption that
whites shall be in the majority.22 2 In Burdick v. Takushi, it allowed
states to deny voters the right to "write in" the candidates of their
choice, a fundamental democratic liberty where the ballot really be-
longs to the people.22 In 1997, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party, the Court upheld state laws that ban the practice of electoral
"fusion" and thus suppress the capacity of new political parties to grow
by "cross-nominating" candidates of their choice and creating multi-
party political coalitions. 224 And in 2000 the Court not only openly
declared that there is no individual right to vote for President but
blithely upheld in a single sentence the disenfranchisement of hun-
dreds of thousands of Americans living in the nation's capital.221
In the twenty-first century, America's tolerance for disen-
franchisement of large communities in the population is unusual.
"One person, one vote" is now the gold standard for political democ-
racy on earth. The constitutions of at least 125 nations, from Angola
and Argentina to Yugoslavia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, explicitly guar-
antee all citizens the right to vote and to be represented at all levels of
government. 226 Canada and Mexico guarantee it.227 Every new Con-
220. 372 U.S. 368, 379-80, 381 (1963).
221. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REv. 1045 (2001) (describing the conservative shift of the Supreme
Court that began in the 1980s).
222. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 295-98 (2000).
223. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992).
224. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 354 (1997).
225. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam); Adams v. Clinton, 531 U.S. 941
(2000).
226. See generally Churchill Bowles et al., Constitution Finder, available at http://
www.urich.edu/-jpjones/confinder/const.htm (last modified Apr. 24, 2001) (providing an
index to all the constitutions of the world).
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stitution adopted over the last decade makes the right to vote the very
foundation of government.
The new Republic of South Africa, for example, defines itself as a
"sovereign democratic state" that has "universal adult suffrage" and a
"multi-party system of democratic government." 221 Its Constitution
provides: "Every adult citizen has the right to vote in elections for any
legislative body established in terms of the Constitution. '229 These
words do not appear in our Constitution and they are not true as a
statement about our political life. While most of us get to vote and
feel strongly that it is a right, the constitutional underpinnings are
feeble.
Our constitutional silence on voting leaves us in fairly dreadful
backward company. By my count, sixteen countries have refused in
their constitutions to commit to suffrage for their people and thus
leave voting to the whims of state officials. These are: Azerbajan, the
Bahamas, Barbados, Chechnya, Dominica, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan,
Libya, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and of
course the United Kingdom, whose phony doctrine of "virtual repre-
sentation" we rebelled against centuries of ago.23° Ironically, we have
appointed ourselves the task of lecturing to the rest of the world on
the construction of democracy by way of the National Democratic In-
stitute, which channels tens of millions of dollars a year to the Demo-
cratic and Republican Parties to spread the gospel of our political
process, which lacks the right to vote.
This sin of constitutional omission is an affront to international
law. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 23 1 in-
spired by triumph over totalitarianism in World War II, provides that:
"Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives. ' 232 Article 25(b) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights proclaims the
right "[t] o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the elec-
227. MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. IV, art. 35; CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 3.
228. S. Anu. CONST. ch. I, § 1.
229. Id. ch. II, § 19, cl. 3(a).
230. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4, 34-36 (2001).
231. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
232. Id. art. 21.
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tors. .. ."233 The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man, adopted in 1948 and the authoritative interpretation of the OAS
charter, to which the United States is a signatory, also secures the
right to participate in free elections. 234
The principle of universal suffrage now lies in tatters. It is time to
catch up with new democratic constitutions abroad where the citizen-
ries have been more faithful to the spirit of our civilizing movements
than we have been ourselves. We need the National Democratic Insti-
tute to spend some of the public's money campaigning for the right to
vote here in America.
E. A Right-to-Vote Amendment
To bring in the disenfranchised, to assure that runaway state leg-
islatures and courts do not bypass the presidential votes of the people
and the will of the majority, to prevent the kinds of dramatic depar-
tures from democratic norms we experienced in 2000, and to redeem
the chaos of the 2000 presidential election, we need to amend the
Constitution. Try on for size the following proposed Twenty-Eighth
Amendment, the Right-to-Vote Amendment:
Section 1. Citizens of the United States of at least eighteen
years of age have the right to cast an effective vote in primary
and general elections for President and Vice President, for
electors for President and Vice President, for their State or
District Representatives and Senators, and for executive and
legislative officers of their state and local legislatures. Such
right shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State.
Section 2. The right of the citizens to vote, participate and
run for office on an equal basis shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
political party affiliation, wealth, or prior condition of
incarceration.
Section 3. The District constituting the Seat of Government
of the United States shall elect Senators and Representatives
in such number and such manner as to which it would be
entitled if it were a State.
233. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25(b), adopted Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
234. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted
by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Docu-
ments Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser. L V/II.82
doc.6 rev. 1, at 17 (1992).
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Section 4. The Congress shall have power to enforce this
Article by appropriate legislation. Nothing in this Article
shall be construed to deny the power of States to expand fur-
ther the electorate.
The campaign for this Amendment will galvanize Americans for a
basic proposition that most of us wrongly assume is already contained
in the Constitution: the right of the people to vote. Such a campaign
will give national coherence to the scattered, lonely, and woefully in-
complete efforts that sprung up across the country after the 2000 elec-
tion to reform anachronistic and manipulable electoral structures in
literally thousands of self-regulating jurisdictions. This amendment,
and the movement behind it, could quickly sweep away partisan and
sectional opposition to the following democratic reforms:
* The push to abolish punch-cards and upgrade and equal-
ize voting technology and machinery across county and
municipal lines.
* The effort to require equal and adequate funding of vot-
ing systems across county and municipal lines.
* The movement to end the scandalous disenfranchise-
ment of nearly 600,000 taxpaying, draftable Americans
living in Washington, D.C., who presently have no voting
representation in Congress.
* The call to give millions of territorial residents the right
to vote for President and Vice President.
" The movement to restore the vote to disenfranchised ex-
felons, hundreds of thousands of citizens who have done
their time and are attempting to reintegrate into society.
* Unsung efforts by third parties and independents to end
discriminatory practices against candidates and voters
based on party identification.
Instead of viewing these seemingly disparate causes as a patch-
work of local grievances, the Voting Rights Amendment will lift the
agenda of electoral reform to a matter of national self-definition and
fundamental constitutional values. The reason why Bush v. Gore, that
unthinkably radical statement about the urgent need for absolute
equality of voting procedures and standards across county lines, sim-
ply won't work in these other cases is because of the charmingly can-
did disclaimer appended to the end of the opinion: "Our
consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem
of Equal Protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities. 23 5 Like Cinderella's dress, the conservatives' gallant
235. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
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defense of voting rights in 2000 turned to rags at midnight on Decem-
ber 12, 2000.
So it is left to the people to bring the American Constitution in line
with the fundamental creed of American political thought that co-
hered in the aftermath of the modern civil rights movement. It is
time to amend the Constitution to provide for what was missing when
it was first drafted and the "revolution's most democratic leaders 23 6
(Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, Samuel Adams, and Patrick
Henry) were absent from the floor of the constitutional convention:
the right of the people to vote and, therefore, the right of the people
to govern.
III. THE MAJORITY'S MISSING RIGHT TO RULE
The case for a right-to-vote amendment is so irresistible that it is
tempting to end the voting rights analysis here. But when it comes to
our democracy deficit, a second step needs to be taken. The problem
is that even if we give millions of disenfranchised people the right to
vote and upgrade state voting systems to count every ballot fairly, we
still face a most demoralizing structural problem made plain by the
2000 presidential election. Because presidential elections are con-
trolled by the electoral college, the majority does not rule. Al Gore
won better than 500,000 votes more than George W. Bush in the na-
tional popular election but was defeated in the electoral college by six
votes. The popular vote winner lost; the popular vote loser won. 23 17
This kind of inversion of democracy has occurred three times
before-in 1824, 1876, and 1888 2 3 -but in the twenty-first century,
when people around the world have rejected every form of tyranny,
these numbers do not add up to democratic legitimacy.
Therefore, after we inscribe the right of each person to vote, we
should amend the Constitution to abolish the electoral college. This
change is necessary for one overriding reason: the electoral college
directly contradicts the sovereignty of the people. Indeed, what good
is it to achieve one vote per person if each person's vote does not
ultimately count equally? It is sometimes hard for us to see this point
because we instinctively identify what is democratic with whatever hap-
pens to be in our Constitution. But a constitutional feature that func-
236. KEyssAR, supra note 222, at 23.
237. Election 2000 National Results, supra note 162.
238. SeeJUDITH A. BEST, THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE?: DEBATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
74 app. B (1996).
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tions quite naturally to defeat the will of the national majority is
sharply at odds with democracy.
The electoral college has the magical power to frustrate majori-
ties at the national level and roll over minorities at the state level,
giving us the worst of all worlds from the standpoint of democracy.
The winner-take-all "unit voting" character of the electoral college in
forty-eight states depresses and deters participation in most of
them.239 In lopsided Democratic presidential states like Massachu-
setts or New York, Republicans have no incentive to compete and get
out the vote; in clear Republican states like Texas or Georgia, the
Democrats similarly give up the ghost long before Election day.
2 4 0
Acting in a perfectly rational way, Governor Bush never challenged
Vice President Gore's presumptive victory in Democratic heartland
states in the Northeast like New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Ma-
ryland, and Rhode Island or other slam-dunks like Hawaii. Similarly,
Vice President Gore, also acting within his best interests, spent little
time or money competing for votes in Republican heartland states in
the Deep South or the Great Plains, such as Mississippi, Alabama,
Georgia, Virginia, Texas, South Carolina, North Dakota, Montana,
and Utah or Republican-bedrock Alaska.241  These dynamics in the
2000 presidential election would actually have been much worse had
Ralph Nader's surprisingly vibrant candidacy not thrown up for grabs
several ordinarily safe Democratic states like Wisconsin, New Mexico,
and West Virginia.
242
The white flag of surrender hoisted by this or that major party in
a majority of states not only thwarts turnout among that party's faith-
ful but, in turn, drags down participation by the dominant party's sup-
239. SeeJUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DiREcT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT 28 (1975).
240. See generally Statement of Lawrence D. Longley Before the U.S. Senate Committee on the
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, in BEST, supra note 238, at 85, 87. Maine and Ne-
braska each award one elector per congressional district to the presidential candidate who
carries it and two electors to the statewide winner. Michael Steele, As Maine and Nebraska
Go ... ,32 NAT'LJ. 3654, 3654 (2000). Some have suggested that this system would be a
fine and more politically plausible alternative to abolition. But there is nothing in this
system that guarantees ultimate majority rule at the national level, and it is likely to
reproduce the political effects of Republican-tilting legislative gerrymanders in the states.
At any rate, it is doubtful that heavily Democratic or Republican presidential states with
corresponding state legislative majorities would consent to abandon their winner-take-all
dominance in presidential elections.
241. See Alexis Simendinger et al., Pondering a Popular Vote, 32 NAT'L J. 3650, 3655
(2000).
242. See Jackie Calmes & Jeanne Cummings, Bush Still Leads, But Key States Buoy Gore,
WALL. ST. J., Nov. 3, 2000, at A22 (listing Wisconsin, West Virginia, and New Mexico as "too
close to call," and noting that Mr. Nader's candidacy was forcing Gore strategists to "con-
sider new ways of building an electoral majority").
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porters, who correctly see no need to rally the troops to counter a
threat. In 2000, the voting rate in Florida soared to 70.1% because
the state was a fiercely contested battleground.243 The candidates and
their running mates practically bought condos in Miami. But most
states were consigned to the safe Democratic or Republican column
long before election day and therefore saw no campaign-no ads, no
mobilization, no competition. Despite surges in voting in swing states,
the overall turnout sat at the dismal fifty percent level, which put the
United States behind every major democracy on earth.244 Thus, the
electoral college system helps create dynamics in which half of Ameri-
cans do not vote. In 2000, less than half of the half which did vote-or
less than a quarter of the nation-determined the victor.
The major-party candidates have no incentive to spend their
scarce time or massive campaign money getting out the vote nation-
wide because the vast majority of voters-all those in safe states-are
structurally rendered superfluous to victory. Campaign resources go
instead to persuade "swing voters" in "swing states," which means that
the politics of the major party candidates blur as they compete for
voters in the middle, leaving the public without a clear choice be-
tween different political programs. When a third party presidential
candidate emerges with some energy, as Ralph Nader did in 2000, all
of the pressure in the system is to drive him out of the race as a
"spoiler." Or, as Christopher Hitchens parodied the New York Times's
editorial position on the Nader campaign, "I agree with everything
you say, but I will oppose your right to say it."24 5
It is hard to see why the votes of Democrats in Texas or Republi-
cans in Massachusetts should be worthless in presidential elections. It
is also hard to see why so many "surplus" Republican votes in Texas or
Democratic votes in Massachusetts should also have no meaning. If
we want people to participate in presidential elections, we should get
rid of the state-based electoral college selections and actually have an
election. If we have to keep the electoral college, we should at least
get rid of all of the pretense that the nation's leaders are troubled by
lack of participation, all of the expensive national conferences on why
243. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N, VOTER REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT 2000, available
at http://www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/reg&toOO.htm (reporting that 68.1% of Flor-
ida's registered voters voted for the President and estimating that another 2% voted with-
out casting a vote for President).
244. Our presidential voting rate for 2000 was lower than presidential turnout in dozens
of nations, from Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, and Australia to Finland, Iceland, India, and
Italy through Venezuela and Zambia. See id.
245. Christopher Hitchens, View From the Left: Don't Blame Nader for Democrats' Problems,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2000, at A26.
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people do not vote, and all of the high-minded sermons by our lead-
ers about the importance of showing up at the polls. The sheer irra-
tionality of the winner-take-all arrangement and the mounting
frustrations of lesser-evil politics gave rise in 2000 to presidential "vote-
swapping" Websites on the Internet where citizens created high-tech
inter-party political coalitions across state and political party lines. 24 6
A. The Electoral College and Political White Supremacy
Because the argument for the electoral college hinges on the pre-
sumptive weight we should attach to history, it is important to see how
the history of the electoral college is intertwined with the institutions
and movements of political white supremacy. The southern slave
states championed the electoral college because it had several clearly
advantageous features for them when compared with a majority na-
tional vote for President.24  Awarding a number of state electors
"equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which
the State may be entitled in the Congress" reproduced a number of
significant pro-slave state biases already sewn into the constitutional
fabric.
2 4 8
The trick was that, by counting slaves as part of the census for the
purpose of reapportioning U.S. House seats, the Constitution would
vastly inflate southern white representation in the House. Thus the
slaves, who obviously could not vote, would swell the congressional
delegation of the slave masters. 249 The slave states brazenly argued
that slaves should be counted as full persons in the census while the
northern states argued they should not be counted at all. 25' The two
sides settled on the infamous "Three-Fifths" provision-a clear victory
for the slave power (though a historical irony because most people do
246. This is a phenomenon I am familiar with because I introduced the idea of vote-
trading, which I actually first called "vote pairing," to America in Slate Magazine on Octo-
ber 24, 2000, several weeks before election day. SeeJamin Raskin, How to Save Al Gore's
Bacon: Gore and Nader Can Both Win, SLATE, Oct. 25, 2000, available at http://
slate.msn.com/?id=91933.
247. There is very little scholarly literature on this point, but Professor Akhil Reed
Ahmar made the point cogently in a New York Times op-ed during the heat of controversy
over the 2000 presidential election when he wrote, "the college was designed at the found-
ing of the country to help one group-white Southern males-and this year, it has appar-
ently done just that." Akhil Reed Ahmar, The Electoral College, Unfair From Day One, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at A23.
248. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
249. See Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the Proslavery
Constitution, 32 AKRON L. Rv. 423, 433-37 (1999).
250. Id. at 434-36.
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not realize that, had the slave states had their way, slaves would have
been counted as full persons).251
Article II then reproduced this effect in presidential elections by
awarding states presidential electors in a number "equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
entitled in the Congress."25 2 The two "add on" electors for each state's
Senators gave further disproportionate power to the less populous
states, especially those with fewer eligible voters-the slave states.2 5 3
The pro-slavery, pro-small state tilt reappeared in the provision
for a so-called "contingent election" in the House of Representatives
upon the failure of any presidential candidate to collect a majority in
the electoral college. In such case, "the House of Representatives
shall immediately choose by Ballot the President," but "the votes shall
be taken by states, the representation from each state having one
vote . . *"4 In such an event, the smaller slave states like South
Carolina or Alabama would receive a major boost up to a level of par-
ity with more populous northern states like New York, Massachusetts,
or New Jersey. Everywhere you look in the intricate electoral college
provisions, the South has dug in its heels.
The subsequent history of the electoral college illuminates its ra-
cial character as the slave power proved adept at winning and manipu-
lating presidential elections. Four of the first five United States
Presidents were slave masters who brought their slaves with them into
the presidency or the White House: George Washington, Thomas Jef-
ferson,James Madison, andJames Monroe (with only the second Pres-
ident, Massachusetts's John Adams, interrupting the reign of slave
masters).25 The failure of the pro-slavery forces to defeat Abraham
Lincoln in the election of 1860 immediately precipitated Southern se-
cession and the Civil War. The 1876 election was thrown into turmoil
because of the failure of any candidate to assemble an electoral col-
lege majority, and then Southern forces, operating in a chaotic post-
election environment not unlike that of 2000, traded the presidency
for a commitment from Republican Rutherford B. Hayes to withdraw
federal troops from the Reconstruction South.2 56
251. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
252. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
253. Id.
254. Id. amend. XII.
255. See Rob Lopresti, Which U.S. Presidents Owned Slaves, available at http://
www.nas.com/-lopresti/ps.htm (last modified Feb. 13, 2002).
256. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 120 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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In the second half of the twentieth century, when the modern
civil rights movement became a critical political force, "white South-
ern politicians . . . repeatedly and deliberately attempted to manipu-
late the machinery of the electoral college to influence national policy
on race and civil rights." 25 v In the 1948 presidential campaign, J.
Strom Thurmond, the then-Democratic Governor of South Carolina,
ran for President on a fiercely segregationist "states' rights" plat-
form. 25" Following through on a brilliant electoral college strategy
suggested by racist theorist Charles Wallace Collins, an Alabama law-
yer and public servant who had served as law librarian of Congress and
librarian of the Supreme Court, Thurmond convinced four state Dem-
ocratic parties, those of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South
Carolina, to nominate slates of electors pledged to vote for him.259
The national Democratic nominee, Harry Truman, found a way onto
the ballot to compete against Thurmond in three of those four states,
but Thurmond still won in all four states and captured thirty-nine
electoral college votes. Truman carried the national election only by
the skin of his teeth, but the Democratic Party received Thurmond's
message loud and clear.260
In 1960, ardent foes of the civil rights movement played the elec-
toral college card again when Alabama and Mississippi selected four-
teen unpledged "free electors" in the presidential contest.261 These
electors ended up voting for Virginia Senator Harry F. Byrd, an archi-
tect of "massive resistance" to Brown v. Board of Education in the South,
and declared their overriding opposition to attempts to "integrate our
schools, do away with literacy tests as a qualification for voting [and]
otherwise undermining everything we hold dear in the South."2 6 2
In 1968, Alabama Governor George C. Wallace, who had fa-
mously declared "segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation
forever," perfected and nationalized the strategy of appealing to race
prejudice to move the whole political spectrum rightward. 263 Wal-
lace's racially inflected blue-collar campaign helped move large num-
bers of white southerners out of their traditional home in the
257. Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President: Minority Vote Dilution and the Electoral
College, 105 YALE LJ. 935, 942 (1996).
258. Id. at 950.
259. For a fascinating discussion of Collins's strategy for Thurmond's presidential cam-
paign, see id. at 950-51.
260. Id. at 954.
261. Id. at 954-56. The "free elector" plan was designed to allow Southern Democrats to
nominate electors who would not support the national Democratic candidate. Id.
262. Id. at 956 (quoting Six Electors Bar Kennedy Support, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1960, at 56).
263. Id. at 957.
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Democratic Party and created fertile terrain for the new Republican
"southern strategy. "264 Wallace won in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Louisiana, and Mississippi, and Richard Nixon, campaigning on a sim-
ilar socially authoritarian platform, took Florida, Kentucky, North Car-
olina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.265 Racist southerners
had successfully used race as a lever to move presidential electors out
of the Democratic column.
In 1980, Ronald Reagan launched his presidential campaign in
the Mississippi town where civil rights activists Schwerner, Chaney,
and Goodman had been murdered in 1965. Reagan turned the solid
Democratic South into the solid Republican South. Although Bill
Clinton cut into this Republican hold on the South, these underlying
dynamics remain powerful.266 In the 2000 election, George W. Bush
launched his southern campaign at fundamentalist Bob Jones Univer-
sity, which banned interracial dating. Bush swept the South: Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, and Vir-
ginia. 2 " These 13 southern states control 163 electoral votes, which is
more than half of the 270 needed to win the election. 268 The Deep
South is the beating heart of the Republican presidential electoral col-
lege coalition.
Because of the nation's racial demography and geography, the
winner-take-all electoral college in the states means that most of the
votes cast by African-Americans in presidential elections will count lit-
erally for nothing. In 2000, more than ninety percent of African-
Americans voted for Democratic nominee Al Gore for President,
something as close to a unanimous endorsement from a community as
one might find.26 9 Yet fifty-eight percent of voting African-Americans,
or 20,202,137 people, live in states that gave 100% of their electoral
college votes to the Republican nominee, George W. Bush. Thus,
most African-Americans voted in states where their votes ended up
having no effect on the ultimate outcome of the election. African-
Americans voted overwhelmingly for the popular vote winner, but it
264. Id. at 959.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 959-61.
267. Presidential Results Summay for All States, available at http://www.cnn.com/ELEC-
TION/2000/results/president (last visited Apr. 25, 2002).
268. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N, DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTORAL VOTES, available at
http://www.fec.gov/pages/elecvote.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2002).
269. See DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, THE
BLACK VOTE IN 2000: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 2 (2000).
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made no difference. 27 0 The one southern state where the African-
American vote clearly might have made a difference was Florida.
271
This fact makes the strategies deployed to cancel out African-Ameri-
can voting power in Florida all the more appalling and the Supreme
Court's tying of a little bow on the whole process all the more cynical.
Florida aside, the structural cancellation of African-American
votes in presidential elections in the South simply reflects the general
operation of the winner-take-all electoral college system. This is the
basic reason to get rid of the electoral college today: each person's
vote should count equally in a presidential election, regardless of ge-
ography, and the winner should actually win. But the electoral college
has grown up with America's sordid racial history, and it continues in
its underground fashion to embolden the minority voice of white ra-
cial conservatism.
B. The "Faithless Elector"
A common argument against the electoral college which I do not
make refers to the danger that a presidential elector, having been
elected pledged to this or that candidate, may later betray that candi-
date by voting for someone else. 272 This is silly because the Framers
designed the electoral college as a deliberative political institution. It
cuts against this purpose to try to hem the elector in. For example,
because we have this institution, what would be wrong with an elector
who had originally pledged to Bush saying, "because the Supreme
Court decision is flawed, the Florida result is in grave doubt, and Gore
won a robust popular majority, I plan to cast my vote for Gore"? This
did not happen, but wouldn't it have reflected the kind of political
wisdom and deliberative judgment the Framers desired and we expect
from our elected leaders?
Moving from a hypothetical example to a real one, didn't we see
a profile in courage in Barbara Lett-Simmons, a Democratic elector
from the District of Columbia who cast a blank ballot to protest the
Democratic nominee's seeming indifference to disenfranchisement in
the District of Columbia?273 Why should we have an electoral college
if the electors are not supposed to use their minds between election
day and the day they cast their ballots?
270. Id.
271. Id. at 5 tbl.2.
272. See generally BEST, supra note 239, at 166-90.
273. See Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Activists Join to Demand Congressional Voting Rights, WASH.
POST, Apr. 19, 2001, at T12.
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C. The Obsolete and Empty Arguments for the Electoral College
1. History.-Arguments in defense of the electoral college turn
inevitably to history: this was the way the Framers intended to have us
elect Presidents, we are told, so this is the way we should do it. 27 4 But
the electoral college was a kind of awkward compromise between ad-
vocates of direct popular election and advocates of congressional elec-
tion within a context suffused with political arguments favoring the
slave power. If we summon up the imagination to discard this obso-
lete and undemocratic plan for electing Presidents-if we become
constitutional framers ourselves-we will be doing nothing un-
characteristic in American history. We have often replaced the handi-
work of the Framers when their ambivalence towards democracy
recurrently thwarted popular control over government. 275 The Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments after the Civil War
wiped out the original exclusionary assumptions of white supremacy
in politics and government. 276 We replaced the indirect method of
electing United States Senators by state legislatures in 1913 with direct
election "by the people" as provided for in the Seventeenth Amend-
ment.2 77 The Nineteenth Amendment rejected the sexism of our
Framers by writing women into the body politic. 2 78 And we have re-
peatedly modified the electoral college itself to bring it closer in line
to our values.
Changing the mode of presidential election actually honors the
democratic values of the Framers far more than an unthinking adher-
ence to the electoral college. Many Founders voiced hopes that fu-
ture generations would not become mindless slaves to antiquated and
mystified constitutional traditions. Judith Shklar has reminded us
that, in his time, ThomasJefferson "detested the 'sanctimonious rever-
ence' with which some men looked at the Constitution. Ancestor wor-
ship was an irrationality no democracy could afford; on the contrary,
we should, he wrote, 'avail ourselves of our reason and experience to
correct the crude essays of our first and inexperienced councils."' 279
Following Thomas Paine, Jefferson insisted that: "The earth belongs
274. See BEST, supra note 239, at 205-18; Statement by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan on the
Electoral College, in BEST, supra note 238, at 151, 151-59; MARTIN DIAMOND, AMERICAN ENTER-
PRISE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE AMERICAN IDEA OF
DEMOCRACY 1-6 (1977).
275. See AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION
REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 3-19 (1998).
276. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
277. Id. amend. XVII.
278. Id. amend. XIX.
279. SHKLAR, supra note 214, at 175.
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in usufruct to the living. The dead have no rights, the earth belongs
to the living."28 °
2. Federalism.-The energy for the pro-electoral college argu-
ment comes now from small states, which have in recent years fallen
hook, line, and sinker for the claim that they benefit politically from
the two-elector "add-on" for Senators. The myth is that presidential
candidates spend more time in smaller states than they otherwise
would because their electors are more of a prize in the current regime
than their people-votes would be in a popular election. 28' Ask any
smallish-state senator and you get the same answer: take away the elec-
toral college and you take away the extra leverage we have to get can-
didates to pay attention to our interests.
This claim, however, is factually wrong. Presidential candidates
go disproportionately to swing states, not small states, and even within
the swing states, they go disproportionately to the larger ones, not the
smaller, because of the winner-take-all effect. In 2000, the candidates
bypassed and took for granted small states that were safely in one col-
umn or the other, for example Republican-controlled North Dakota
or Idaho or Democratic-controlled Rhode Island or the District of Co-
lumbia. To the extent that a jurisdiction's political interests are
deemed to be taken seriously when candidates visit them (a most du-
bious assumption in any event), none of these places picked up any
influence by virtue of being small. The states that profited from the
electoral college were large swing states like Florida, Pennsylvania,
Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and then, and only to a much lesser extent,
small swing states like New Mexico, West Virginia, and New
Hampshire.282
The mathematical rationale for the intuitively predictable candi-
date behavior of favoring large swing states to small ones was ex-
plained in a superb law review article in 1968 by John F. Banzhaf III,
who proved that, under the electoral college system, individual voters
in large states enjoy much greater voting power than those in small
states.283 Through a meticulous examination of the chance that vot-
ers have to "affect the outcome in a given situation,' 284 Banzhaf found
that a voter in New York in 1968 had more than three times the "vot-
280. Id. at 138.
281. See BEST, supra note 238, at 34-35.
282. Calmes & Cummings, supra note 242.
283. SeeJohn F. Banzhaf III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral
College, 13 VILL. L. REv. 304 (1968).
284. Id. at 307.
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ing power" of a voter in Washington, D.C.28 5 Many scholars have
since corroborated and elaborated the Banzhaf thesis that, all other
things being equal, it makes more sense in the electoral college re-
gime for candidates to invest resources in larger states than in smaller
ones.
286
It is important to see why there is so much confusion over this
point. The Framers undoubtedly intended the smaller states to have a
disproportionate share of the power in selecting a President, and in-
deed it worked like this when electors were chosen by state legislatures
and acted deliberatively, as individuals, to decide who should be Presi-
dent. In that system, the two-elector add-on really helped this or that
small-state elector-politico to broker a deal that would somehow bene-
fit his state.28 7
But when states moved from this process of appointing free-
wheeling electors to the winner-take-all unit system of pledged elec-
tors, all that mattered in political terms was moving majorities of vot-
ers in the largest swing states to vote for the right slate of electors. In
other words, the Banzhaf factor took over. 288 Senators from smaller
states swear by the electoral college today because they know in their
bones that the Framers' compromise was designed to help them and
that the electoral college is structurally linked to the composition of
the Senate. But today the joke is on them because in reality the elec-
toral college no longer works in their favor.
The shrewder small states recognized this fact long ago. In 1966,
in the aptly named Delaware v. New York, Delaware and a group of
other small states tried unsuccessfully to sue New York and other large
states on equal protection grounds for awarding their electors in the
unit bloc fashion.289 The Court refused to entertain the filing of an
original jurisdiction action, but the political logic of the new regime
was clarified.2 90 The smaller states saw that the traditional pro-small
285. Id. at 313.
286. See, e.g., The Electoral College's Biases in the 1992 Election-and Beyond in the Electoral
College and Direct Election of the President: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of
the Committee on the Judiciary on S.J Res. 297, S.J Res. 302, and S.J Res. 312, 102nd Cong. 38,
4244 (1992) (testimony of Lawrence D. Longley &James D. Dana,Jr.); George Rabinowitz
& Stuart Elaine McDonald, The Power of the States in U.S. Presidential Elections, 80 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 65, 75-78 (1986).
287. See Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Framers, Federalism, and One Person,
One Vote, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2526, 2528-29 (2001)
288. Banzhaf, supra note 283, at 306-08.
289. Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966).
290. See id.
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state bias in the electoral college had been defeated and reversed by
the big states' winner-take-all method of distributing electors.291
Even if it were true that the electoral college regime differentially
helps jurisdictions like Delaware, North Dakota, and the District of
Columbia (and it seems demonstrably false), such a disproportion
would be indefensible as a matter of democratic principle (as opposed
to raw political assertion). The President is presumably the leader of
the nation, not the patchwork of electoral majorities in particular
states that gave him all their electors. This principle is all the more
important in a time of war when the President should speak for the
people of the whole nation. But the electoral college can only en-
courage Presidents to think of the country in the red and blue terms
of a CNN election-night map: friendly regions, where the base needs
constant watering and replenishment, and unfriendly regions that
should be generally avoided and gently disregarded. If we move to a
direct popular vote where every vote counts, Presidents will have effec-
tive voting constituents everywhere, even in the most "hostile" areas, and
will be motivated to represent the full breadth of the nation. Presi-
dents elected by the people will govern mindful of the whole nation,
not just 270 electors.
D. The Popular Election of the President Amendment
Consider the following amendment to adopt direct popular elec-
tion of the President, which includes a built-in "instant run-off" provi-
sion to guarantee that the winner actually has majority support of the
voters:
The President and Vice President shall be elected by direct
popular vote of all U.S. citizens eighteen years of age and
older, but no person shall be elected President who has not
attained at least 50 percent support among the votes cast.
Whenever there are three or more candidates listed on the
ballot, the ballot shall ask voters to rank their choices in or-
der of preference. If no candidate receives at least 50 per-
cent of the first-place votes cast, the last-place candidate's
ballots shall be redistributed to the second-choice candidates
of these voters. This instant run-off method continues until
a candidate has achieved a majority of all votes cast.
291. See id.; see also Note, supra note 287, at 2531 ("The emergence of the popular-vote,
winner-take-all system for state selection of electors, which the Framers did not anticipate,
has rendered the notion of any consistent small state, regional, or federalist protection in
the electoral college highly tenuous.").
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Of the several important changes embodied in this Popular Elec-
tion of the President Amendment, the enactment of majority rule is
only the most obvious. The development of direct election by the
people means that all Americans will, for the first time in history, par-
ticipate together as citizens in a single and truly national election.
Our first direct election of the President will mark an important politi-
cal emancipation for American civil society, which has been artificially
segmented and divided into fifty-one separate voting jurisdictions with
different rules, procedures, and ballots. State lines are meaningful
and defensible in congressional elections, but puzzlingly irrational
and out of place when choosing a President, a unitary executive who
acts for the entire nation. Americans should vote as one nation with a
single presidential ballot that looks the same in Maine and Hawaii, Cali-
fornia and Florida. Furthermore, by granting all citizens the right to
vote for President, the amendment would for the first time allow
American citizens living in the territories of Guam, American Samoa,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands to vote for President. Because
they do not belong to states and do not pay federal taxes, territorial
residents would continue to have only nonvoting representation in
Congress, but their existing place in the American regime would be
properly recognized by giving them a role in presidential elections.
The shift to popular election of the President will also redistrib-
ute political power. A similar transformation took place in 1913 when
the Seventeenth Amendment shifted the mode of election of U.S.
Senators from state legislative selection to direct election by the peo-
ple. 29 2 The new method ended the practice of out-of-state businesses
purchasing the friendship of so-called "corporation Senators" through
well-placed bribes and covert campaign contributions in state legisla-
tures. A progressive reform pushed by the Populists, direct election of
the Senators removed multiple levels of political filtering that blocked
real democratic accountability and responsiveness. 29 ' Today, when
presidential elections are influenced by hundreds of millions of dol-
lars in corporate soft money, closed corporate-sponsored debates, and
the taking for granted of most of the population with fine-tuned poll-
ster-driven manipulation of the rest, a changeover to popular election
will break the current top-down dynamics of the system.
The Popular Election of the President Amendment replaces the
bizarre Rube Goldberg-type contraptions of the electoral college-the
two-vote add-on, the lengthy delays between popular voting and the
292. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
293. See Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1352-55 (1996).
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casting of the electoral college votes, the contingent House election
based on state-by-state voting, the recurring possibilities of popular
vote losers winning the election-with clean and simple majority rule.
A majority is guaranteed by virtue of the "instant run-off' mechanism,
which assures that the winner will achieve a popular mandate without
requiring that an expensive second (or third) run-off election be
held. This method of voting not only guarantees that candidates will
take office with majority support but dampens partisan invective and
rancor during the campaign. Candidates have no interest in polariz-
ing things because they want to become a group of voters' second
favored choice even if they cannot not be their first. This instant run-
off mechanism is gaining increasing support around the country. On
March 5, 2002, the people of San Francisco voted fifty-six percent-
forty-four percent to adopt instant run-off voting for their most im-
portant leaders. Rob Richie and the Center for Voting and Democ-
racy in Takoma Park, Maryland, have made a signal contribution to
public discourse by putting the instant run-off on the democracy
agenda.
Popular election of the President advances the one person-one
vote principle far more effectively than the electoral college ever
could. Because all the tools of the electoral college are blunt and
rusty instruments, even with a Right-To-Vote-Amendment in place we
will remain a long way from each person's vote counting equally. The
Banzhaf principle, which measures the chances of a vote affecting the
outcome of the presidential election, tells us that individual votes in
large states are worth much more than individual votes in small
states.294 If we disregard that dynamic analysis and just consider ab-
stractly what percentage of a single electoral college vote each voter
controls, then the effect reverses and voters in small states have a clear
advantage. Each voter in Vermont or Idaho thus has more say in the
electoral college than each voter in New York or California. Moreo-
ver, the vagaries of voter turnout also create distortions in the electo-
ral college: other things being equal, a single vote in a high turnout
state is worth less than a single vote in a low turnout state. In sum, if
we really want each citizen's vote to count equally in presidential elec-
tions, we need to move to direct popular election of the President.
Amazingly, the government of the United States conducts and
provides no official count of the vote for President. Thus, we never
know in any reliable sense who actually won the most votes. This is a
dramatic problem. In 2000 the people were completely dependent
294. Banzhaf, supra note 283, at 307, 313.
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upon private corporate media to report vote totals from thousands of
jurisdictions around the country based on some hazy combination of
precinct returns, polling, and exit interviews. The public was utterly
helpless before the ever-changing projections and declarations of vic-
tory issued by broadcast entities. It now looks as if that process may
have been contaminated by strategic partisan manipulation. 29 5
The vagaries of vote-counting put the icing on the cake that is
baked behind the scenes by state secretaries of state, electors, party
bosses, state legislatures and Supreme Court Justices-almost every-
body but the people. We need to establish a constitutional right to
vote and then replace the electoral college with direct national major-
ity rule in presidential elections. We need a national ballot for Presi-
dent based on a national election with a national system of reporting
the tally. It is time for the people to claim America's presidential elec-
tions as our own and fulfill the lost promise of becoming a democratic
nation.
CONCLUSION
It is easy enough to show that the Supreme Court majority in
Bush v. Gore departed drastically from well-accepted norms of constitu-
tional interpretation. Ultimately, however, the critical point for the
American people is to prevent a repetition of these events, which con-
stituted a serious assault on political democracy. Bush v. Gore exposed
the weak constitutional status of the citizen's right to vote and the
majority's right to win and rule. We need to amend the Constitution
to inscribe and protect what most Americans erroneously thought was
already there.
295. See NICHOLS, supra note 58, at 1-26.
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